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Abstract
This paper studies an economy where demand spillovers make firms’ production decisions
strategic complements. Firms choose their operating leverage trading off higher fixed costs
for lower variable costs. Operating leverage governs firms’ exposures to an aggregate labor
productivity shock. In equilibrium, firms exhibit excessive operating leverage as they do not
internalize that an economy with higher aggregate operating leverage is more likely to fall
into a recession following a negative productivity shock. Welfare losses coming from firms’
failure to coordinate production are amplified by suboptimal risk-taking, which magnifies
the impact of productivity shocks onto aggregate output.
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1. Introduction
Labor leverage is a first-order determinant of firms’ risk as it creates a rigid cost structure
that cannot be easily adjusted to demand shocks. For instance, Danthine and Donaldson
(2002) note that the obligations originated by firms’ labor force dwarf their financial obli-
gations and provide evidence consistent with labor leverage generating undiversifiable risk.
A subsequent stream of literature in asset pricing (e.g., Merz and Yashiv, 2007; Donan-
gelo, Gourio, Kehrig, and Palacios, 2019; and Faviloukis, Lin, and Zhao, 2020) has shown
that labor leverage has explanatory power in the pricing of equity and debt, both in the
cross-section and in aggregate. In this paper, we endogenize firms’ labor leverage decisions
and study how these firm-level choices compound into aggregate risk. Specifically, labor
leverage affects the likelihood that the economy falls into a Pareto-inferior equilibrium in
which output is depressed and welfare is low. These episodes of coordination failure are
interpreted as economic crises, in line with a long tradition in economics. While these crises
are self-fulfilling in nature, the global games approach (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2000) suggests
that their occurrence is anchored to fundamentals through firms’ exposure to a common
productivity shock. We illustrate how this transmission channel operates through labor
leverage and evaluate its implications for the risk of recessions and more broadly for welfare.
We consider an imperfectly competitive economy with aggregate demand spillovers as in
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). The economy is populated by consumers who supply
labor to firms in different sectors. Labor is subject to a productivity shock, which is the only
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source of risk in this economy. Firms are collectively owned by consumers and use labor as
their sole input to produce final goods. Each sector has a competitive fringe of firms with
a constant returns to scale technology and a unique large firm with an increasing returns
to scale technology. Increasing returns to scale generates strategic complementarities across
sectors: higher profits in one firm trickle down to consumers and stimulate their demand
for goods in other sectors. Higher demand, in turn, allows firms in other sectors to leverage
their increasing returns to scale technologies and increase their own profits.
Importantly, we allow large firms to adjust their cost structure ex ante. For instance,
in Chaney and Ossa (2013), firms organize production by choosing their division of labor,
which trades off fixed versus marginal costs. A greater division of labor is associated to higher
labor leverage. We interpret labor leverage as an enduring technological and organizational
choice, consistent with the idea that adjustments to the size and structure of the labor force
within a firm requires time and involves sizeable costs. More specifically, at the initial date,
each firm chooses its labor leverage, trading off higher fixed labor costs for lower variable
labor costs. Labor leverage determines the exposure of a firm’s profits to the aggregate
productivity shock. On the one hand, when demand is high, a firm benefits from higher
leverage as it can produce at a lower average cost. On the other hand, higher leverage,
by raising fixed labor costs, makes a firm more vulnerable to a drop in demand. At that
final date, the productivity shock is realized and large firms set prices to maximize profits
given the threat from the competitive fringe. A firm, however, retains the option to leave
the market following a negative productivity shock if it expects demand to be insufficient
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to cover its fixed costs.
Finally, we assume that tasks in large firms are subject to moral hazard. This is consistent
with the idea that in larger and more complex organizations, information frictions create
room for opportunistic behavior. Similar to Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), it is the
combination of demand externalities and this labor friction that ultimately creates scope
for coordination failures. Specifically, the presence of moral hazard requires large firms to
pay a premium over the wage in the competitive fringe, and these firms fail to internalize
the demand spillovers that higher wages have on the rest of the economy. As a result, in
the final date, the economy can be trapped in an equilibrium in which large firms exit and
output is inefficiently low.
The main contribution of the paper is to show that coordination failures at the production
stage contaminate ex ante risk-taking decisions and generate excessive labor leverage in
aggregate. We derive this result in two steps. First, we study production decisions at
the final date and show that when labor productivity falls below a threshold, coordination
motives generate a sharp transition from a Pareto-optimal production outcome in which large
firms reap the benefits of increasing returns to scale, to a Pareto-inferior outcome in which
large firms cease to operate. Importantly, we also show that this endogenous operating
threshold is higher when firms’ aggregate labor leverage increases, that is, an increase in
labor leverage increases the likelihood of a coordination failure.
We then turn to ex ante labor leverage decisions. When setting their labor leverages,
firms take into account their option to cease operations when demand is low. Because of
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this option, firms optimize leverage over the states in which they anticipate being active.
Coordination problems make it less likely for large firms to survive a bad productivity shock,
which tilts each firm’s optimization program towards higher-productivity states. In these
states, the return to labor leverage is higher, so that aggregate labor leverage rises when
the production-stage coordination problem worsens. We show that the equilibrium labor
leverage is constrained inefficient: a social planner that takes the production-stage equilib-
rium as given could increase welfare by forcing all firms to lower their labor leverage. The
welfare loss caused by excess labor leverage occurs through a shift of the output distribution
towards high-productivity states that comes at the cost of higher downside risk and lower
expected output. Intuitively, each firm chooses its labor leverage taking the aggregate labor
leverage as given. Hence, firms do not internalize that their collective decision to increase
labor leverage raises the coordination threshold, making it more likely that the economy
coordinates on a Pareto-inferior regime with depressed output.
The excessive labor leverage is inherently related to the existence of a coordination failure.
To formally make this point, we also study a case without coordination failures, that is, a case
in which we allow firms to coordinate on the Pareto-superior equilibrium at the production
stage. As mentioned earlier, atomistic firms do not internalize that a collective decrease
in leverage would widen the range of states in which production takes place. However,
when firms coordinate on the Pareto-superior equilibrium, production decisions are optimal
ex post and hence, the social value of producing in the marginal state (at the production
threshold) is exactly zero. Therefore, a marginal decrease in aggregate labor leverage would
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extend production to a state where it brings no social value. In that case, the equilibrium
leverage is constrained efficient. By contrast, when there is a coordination failure at the
production stage, there exists a region just below the production threshold where the net
value of all firms switching from inaction to production is strictly positive.
Our paper builds on a stream of literature in economics that grounds low aggregate out-
put realizations into coordination failures. (See Diamond, 1982; Hart, 1982; and Weitzman,
1982, for early contributions.) Cooper and John (1988) provide a general framework to an-
alyze economies in which agents’ actions are strategic complements. In our paper, demand
complementarities originate from a combination of imperfect competition and increasing re-
turns to scale technologies as in Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Kiyotaki (1988) and Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). Lamont (1995) shows that coordination failures arise with im-
perfect competition but constant returns to scale economy when firms can suffer from debt
overhang. The common feature in these papers is the existence of multiple self-fulfilling equi-
libria that can be Pareto-ranked. While this illustrates how economies can be trapped into
inferior low-output equilibria, equilibrium indeterminacy precludes a meaningful analysis of
firms’ ex ante risk-exposure decisions, the objective of our paper.
To overcome this problem, we take advantage of global games techniques. As shown in
Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), introducing dispersed information in games of strategic
complementarities can lead to a unique equilibrium prediction pinned down by the realization
of an underlying economic fundamental. Chamley (1999) and Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011)
use this insight to study economies in which agents’ investment decisions exhibit a generic
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form of complementarity. Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2018) introduce global games
in a dynamic model with demand complementarities and show how transitory shocks can
trigger long-lasting periods of depressed investment and recession. Guimaraes and Morris
(2008) show that risk-averse agents’ exposures to an underlying source of risk affect the
outcome of the coordination game they play. Our contribution to this body of literature is
to endogenize risk-taking; that is, agents’ exposures to the underlying common risk factor.
Our paper is also related to the literature on operating leverage and firms’ risk initiated
by Lev (1974). More specifically, a stream of papers in finance focuses on labor leverage,
building on the premise that labor is the main fixed component of firms’ cost structures.
Danthine and Donaldson (2002) note that labor generates obligations for firms that are of
an order of magnitude greater than their financial obligations, and that the labor share
is countercyclical. These empirical observations motivate a general equilibrium model in
which labor leverage creates nondiversifiable risk for equity holders. Subsequent papers
have shown labor leverage to be positively related to CAPM beta, stock volatility, credit
risk, and procyclicality of profits in a cross-section of firms. (See, for instance, Donangelo,
Gourio, Kehrig, and Palacios, 2019 and Faviloukis, Lin, and Zhao, 2020.) Merz and Yashiv
(2007) show that the shape and magnitude of labor adjustment costs effectively makes
hiring conceptually similar to an investment. These empirical findings lend support to the
mechanism at play in the model where operating leverage is driven by labor costs and
constitutes a structural long-term choice that affects a firm’s exposure to aggregate risk.
Finally, there is a large body of literature that studies the relation between financial
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frictions and economic crises. (See, for instance, Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki
and Moore, 1997; Lorenzoni, 2008; Gorton and Ordoñez, 2014; and He and Kondor, 2016.)
This literature highlights the role of financial frictions (e.g., credit constraints arising from
contract incompleteness) in generating and amplifying crises. While the role of financial
leverage in economic crises has been extensively studied, the role of operating leverage has
received less attention. This is despite the fact that financial distress is typically preceded
by economic distress, and despite the importance of firms’ non-financial obligations in com-
parison to their financial obligations. For instance, according to the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, employee compensation for US non-financial corporations in 2018, $5,946 billions,
amounted to 17 times their net interest payments, $33 billions. The nature of operating
leverage and financial leverage are also markedly distinct: firms may change their capital
structure by going to the capital market or through renegotiation, whereas operating lever-
age is a structural choice that cannot be adjusted in the short run. Moreover, firms can
use financial markets to hedge against the costs associated to financial risk. In contrast,
financial markets are of limited use in managing operating risk as hedging does not change
the cost structure and therefore, whether firms create or destroy value. Our paper suggests
that these fundamental technological and organizational choices at the firm level can have
outsized aggregate effects in economies subject to coordination failures.
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2. Model




defined over a unit interval of goods indexed by q. Each consumer is endowed with L units of
labor that he supplies inelastically, so L is also the total amount of labor in the economy. L
is drawn from a uniform distribution over [0, L], and the realization of L is interpreted as an
economy-wide labor productivity shock, the only source of risk in this economy. To ensure
the existence of equilibria in which agents’ optimization problems have interior solutions, we
take the upper bound, L, to be large enough, in a sense we make precise in the Appendix
(for most results, L > 2).
Each good q is produced by a sector, and each sector consists of two types of firms. A
competitive fringe of firms with a constant returns to scale technology in which one unit
of output requires one unit of labor, and a unique firm, a monopolist, with access to an
increasing returns to scale technology. To produce, monopolist q incurs a fixed cost of
F (sq) = sqα−sq units of labor and a constant marginal cost of α − sq units of labor per unit
of output. We assume α < 1, and take sq ∈ [0, α] to be a choice variable that captures
operating leverage: by increasing sq, monopolist q reduces its marginal labor cost α − sq
at the expense of inflating its fixed labor cost F (sq).1 The model is closed by assuming
that consumers own all the profits and that each firm maximizes expected profits where the
1The optimization problem with respect to operating leverage sq, which we study below, is not convex
so local conditions are not sufficient for global optimality. The convex function we choose for F (sq) provides
the necessary analytical tractability for studying large deviations to determine existence. However, as
Proposition 10 in Section 5.3 shows, the economic intuitions of the paper hold for any generic increasing
and convex function.
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workers’ wage per unit of labor is taken as the numeraire.2
Consistent with the literature on labor leverage surveyed in the introduction, we interpret
leverage sq as a structural, long-term choice that regulates monopolist q’s cost structure in
future production periods. As originally illustrated by Adam Smith’s famous pin factory
example, a key decision in the organization of production is the division of labor, which he
argued to be limited by the market size. Chaney and Ossa (2013) provide a formalization of
Adam Smith’s argument. In their model, firms choose their division of labor trading off fixed
and marginal costs. Specifically, a greater number of teams, which would allow for a greater
division of labor, is associated with higher fixed costs but lower marginal costs. (Each team
bears a fixed cost but having more teams allows each team to perform a narrower range of
tasks around a core competency.) As the expected size of the market increases, firms choose
a greater division of labor, that is, a production technology with higher operating leverage.
To capture the enduring quality of these long-term technological and organizational
choices and therefore, that firms cannot respond to a productivity shock by swiftly changing
their production technologies, we assume that each monopolist q chooses sq at t = 0, before
the realization of the productivity shock and the production decisions at t = 1. At t = 1,
the final period, L, is realized, and all firms decide how much to produce and at which price





ensures that consumers’ marginal utility of income is constant across
states and hence, that consumers behave as risk-neutral vis-à-vis aggregate uncertainty. Consequently,
maximizing expected profits is equivalent to maximizing firm value. We can also take the wage per unit of
labor as the numeraire because, as will become clear below, the real wage is constant across realizations of
the aggregate shock L.
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it saves the fixed cost F (sq), but abandons production in sector q to the competitive fringe.
Hence, labor cost F (sq) is fixed rather than sunk as, for instance, in Maskin and Tirole
(1988): “Fixed costs (measured as a flow) persist only as long as production continues, but
are, strictly speaking, independent of scale. Pure sunk costs . . . are incurred with or without
production.” Therefore, the irreversibility in the model is in the labor leverage choice, sq,
that is, in the firm’s choice of its technology.
Finally, we assume that production by monopolists requires monitoring that needs to
be incentivized. Specifically, a subset of the workers hired by each monopolist performs
supervisory functions, where each supervisor is responsible for a share of the firm’s produc-
tion. If a supervisor exerts monitoring effort, each unit produced under his supervision is
functional, but he incurs a personal cost β per unit.3 If a supervisor does not exert effort,
units are defective and worthless to consumers. Quality is contractible, and we assume
that α + β < 1, so that the overall marginal cost is still lower when a monopolist produces
than when the competitive fringe does. This specification is consistent with monopolists
being larger, more sophisticated organizations in which division of labor and information
frictions require supervisory tasks of a different nature than the tasks required in small
fringe firms. For instance, Garicano and Van Zandt (2012) reviews a body of literature
in which hierarchies and division of labor jointly emerge as a response to costly informa-
tion processing. This monitoring friction is also isomorphic to the assumption in Murphy,
3Having a cost of effort proportional to production ensures that only aggregate effort within a firm,
rather than the mass of supervisors or the scope of their assignments, matters.
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Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) who posit that workers experience a disutility when working for
monopolist firms rather than for firms in the competitive fringe, as we discuss in Section 5.1.
The disutility in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) is in the spirit of Rosenstein-Rodan
(1943), capturing the idea that to bring farm laborers to work in a factory, a firm must pay
them a wage premium. While their specification is tailored to developing economies where a
“big push” can jump-start development, our specification has a more natural interpretation
in developed economies where business cycles are amplified by coordination failures. As in
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), the role of this assumption is to generate equilibrium
multiplicity and the possibility of a coordination failure at the production stage. This allows
us to study the relation between coordination failures in production at t = 1 and risk-taking
decisions at t = 0, the objective of this paper. As will become clear below (Proposition 4),
our results are not related to the monitoring friction per se, but to the possibility of a
coordination failure.
Fig. 1 below illustrates the timing of events. Notice that production only takes place at
t = 1, after the realization of the productivity shock L. A setup in which firms produce both
at t = 0 and at t = 1 would produce qualitatively similar results, provided that monopolists
cannot change their chosen technologies between the two periods. (See the Online Appendix
for such case.) In other words, what is important for our results is that monopolists cannot
respond to the productivity shock by quickly changing their production technologies at
t = 1; that is, that firms’ technological and organizational choices are long lasting. As we
will show, this causes monopolists’ choices of operating leverage ex ante (t = 0) to affect the
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probability of a coordination failure ex post (t = 1).
Each monopolist chooses





its price and quantity
t=1
Fig. 1. Timing of events
3. Coordination failures and excess operating leverage
3.1. Demand externalities and equilibrium multiplicity
The analysis of the final period (t = 1) is analogous to the one in Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1989). A reader familiar with their analysis could jump to Lemma 1 below, which
summarizes a result equivalent to the one in their paper, and which we take as a building
block.
Each consumer buys the consumption basket {x(q)}q∈[0,1] that maximizes his utility given











p(q)x(q) = y. (1)








p(q) if p(q) ≤ 1,
0 if p(q) > 1.
(2)
Note that the monopolist is priced out if it sets p(q) > 1: since the competitive fringe
can produce one unit of good q with one unit of labor whose wage is the numeraire, the
price in the competitive fringe is equal to one. Given the demand function in Eq. (2), if
monopolist q is active, it sets the highest price that generates a positive demand, p(q) = 1,
and produces x(q) = y units of output. Because monitoring requires effort, supervisors have
to be paid a premium over the wage in the competitive fringe. Since quality is contractible,
and since the probability of producing a functional unit without monitoring effort is zero,
promising a bonus β conditional on delivering a functioning unit is sufficient to incentivize
monitoring, and only compensates the supervisor for his monitoring cost. The profit of an
active monopolist, given that p(q) = 1 and x(q) = y, is then
πq = (1− β − α + sq) y − F (sq). (3)
Monopolist q is active when πq ≥ 0. Consumption and production decisions endogenously
determine aggregate income at t = 1. Specifically, aggregate income, or equivalently, aggre-
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where A ⊂ [0, 1] is the set of sectors in which a monopolist is active at t = 1. From
Eq. (4), monitoring does not affect aggregate income y for a given set of active monopolists
A: monitoring reduces the profit of each active monopolist by βy but increases labor income




q∈A F (sq) dq
1−
∫
q∈A[1− α + sq] dq
. (5)
From Eq. (5), we can derive the marginal impact on output y of monopolist i joining the
set of active monopolists A:4
dy = πi(y) + βy1−
∫
q∈A[1− α + sq] dq
di. (6)
This expression captures an important intuition for production decisions at t = 1: the
contribution of the marginal active monopolist i to output is that monopolist’s profit πi(y)
plus the paid wage premium βy amplified by a multiplier (1−
∫
q∈A 1−α+ sq dq)−1, which is










, and Eq. (6) is just y′(0) where we use Eq. (4) to simplify the
expression.
14
strictly greater than one as long as the set of active monopolists A has a positive mass. This
multiplier captures a demand externality: when πi(y) + βy is positive, the profit and the
wage premium stimulates demand for other goods, which allows other active monopolists
to take advantage of their increasing returns to scale technologies and increase their own
profits.
Note that monopolist i, by becoming active, generates βy as compensation for the super-
visors’ monitoring cost, in addition to profit πi(y). Factoring in this monitoring cost βy in




q∈A[1− α + sq] dq
− βy. (7)
This expression shows how the demand multiplier (1−
∫
q∈A 1−α+sqdq)−1 and the monitoring
cost βy combine to create a wedge between private and social incentives. The sign of
a monopolist’s profit πi(y) and the sign of its impact on welfare (i.e., the sign of Eq. (7))
coincide if there is no multiplier (i.e., A = {∅} so (1−
∫
q∈A 1−α+sqdq)−1 = 1) in which case
Eq. (7) reduces to πi(y). The misalignment of private and social incentives arises when β > 0
and a strictly positive mass of monopolists is active. In that case, monopolist i internalizes
the monitoring cost βy through the wage premium it pays, but not the multiplier effect of
that additional compensation on the demand to other active monopolists A. Specifically,
if πi(y) < 0 < (πi(y) + βy) (1 −
∫
q∈A 1 − α + sqdq)−1 − βy, it is individually optimal for
monopolist i to leave the market, yet its net effect on consumers’ utility if it were to produce
15
would be positive (i.e., Eq. (7) would be greater than zero).
This misalignment creates scope for coordination failures. Consider the case in which all
monopolists choose the same operating leverage s at t = 0. Then, combining Eq. (3) and
Eq. (4), a monopolist does not operate if no other monopolist operates (if A = {∅}) when
L <
F (s)
1− α− β + s . (8)
Conversely, a monopolist operates if all other monopolists operate (if A = [0, 1]) when
L >
(1− β)F (s)





1− α− β + s,
F (s)
1− α− β + s
)
, (10)
a high-output equilibrium in which all monopolists are active coexists with a low-output
equilibrium in which the fringe takes over production. That second equilibrium is Pareto-
dominated and embodies a coordination failure: each monopolist does not internalize that
its individual decision to produce and pay a wage premium increases demand and hence,
the other monopolists’ profits from producing. We summarize this discussion in the next
lemma.
Lemma 1. If all monopolists choose the same operating leverage at t = 0, then at t = 1: (i)
if L > F (s)1−α−β+s , all monopolists operate; (ii) if L <
(1−β)F (s)
1−α−β+s , no monopolist operates; and







, there is one equilibrium in which all monopolists operate
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and another Pareto-dominated equilibrium in which no monopolist operates.
3.2. Global games and the production threshold
While the presence of multiple equilibria captures the idea of a coordination failure, the
indeterminacy at the production stage at t = 1 precludes the analysis of the operating
leverage decision at t = 0. To resolve this indeterminacy, we now depart from Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) and apply a global games treatment. This is done by introducing
dispersed information: at t = 1, each monopolist q observes a noisy signal of L, lq = L+ ξq,
where ξq is independent across monopolists and uniformly distributed on [−ε, ε]. One can
show there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to threshold strategies in which
monopolist q operates at t = 1 if lq is above a threshold l∗. Then, for a given L, the mass
of active monopolists is
n(L) ≡

1 if L > l∗ + ε
L+ε−l∗
2ε if L ∈ [l
∗ − ε, l∗ + ε]
0 if L < l∗ − ε
. (11)





(1− α− β + s) L− n(L)F (s)1− n(L)(1− α + s) − F (s) dL = 0, (12)
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which uniquely pins down l∗. Finally, a well-known property of global games is that equilib-
rium uniqueness carries over to the asymptotic case in which the noise in the signals vanishes,
ε → 0, and the information structure becomes arbitrarily close to common knowledge. In
that case, solving for l∗ in Eq. (12) delivers the threshold on the underlying state L above
which production takes place,
LT (s) ≡ F (s)1− α + s +
βF (s)





Proposition 1. If all monopolists choose operating leverage s at t = 0 and ε→ 0, then all
monopolists operate at t = 1 if L ≥ LT (s) and no monopolist operates at t = 1 if L < LT (s).
The production equilibrium in Proposition 1 has two important features. First, the equi-
librium bears an economically intuitive relation to fundamentals: monopolists are more
likely to operate for higher realizations of the productivity shock L. Notice that the pro-








. Specifically, the global games treatment selects the Pareto-






, that is, for the lower realizations of the
productivity shock, thereby maintaining scope for coordination failures.
Second, the production threshold LT (s) is increasing in aggregate operating leverage s: a
more levered economy needs a higher productivity shock to coordinate on the production
equilibrium at t = 1; that is, operating leverage aggravates the coordination problem. Note
also that, if monopolists were to choose zero operating leverage, there would no coordina-
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tion failures at t = 1 as monopolists would always produce (i.e., LT (0) = 0). Therefore,
coordination failures will endogenously arise in the model because of monopolists’ incentives
to take on operating leverage. Next, we build on Proposition 1 to analyze these incentives
and to derive the equilibrium operating leverage at t = 0.
3.3. Equilibrium operating leverage
The distinct feature in our model is to allow each monopolist q to calibrate its exposure to
the aggregate shock L through the choice of operating leverage sq; that is, we endogenize
risk-taking. To build intuition on the relation between operating leverage and risk, we start
with two simple observations.
First, monopolist q only produces at t = 1 if πq ≥ 0, which, from Eq. (3), requires demand
to be high enough: y ≥ F (sq)1−α−β+sq . This income threshold,
F (sq)
1−α−β+sq , increases with sq: a
monopolist with higher operating leverage needs higher demand to cover its fixed cost F (sq),
and hence is more likely to exit the market at t = 1. The adverse effect of operating leverage
on profits can extend to states in which demand is high enough to allow the monopolist to
operate (i.e., πq ≥ 0) yet too low for the lower marginal costs to outweigh the higher fixed
costs: ∂πq
∂sq
< 0 if y < α(α−sq)2 . However, as demand increases further, higher leverage becomes
beneficial: ∂πq
∂sq
> 0 if y > α(α−sq)2 . Intuitively, operating leverage magnifies the impact of
demand shocks on profits, ∂πq
∂y
= sq, and therefore is more valuable when demand is high.
Second, shocks to demand y are driven by shocks to labor productivity L, as is apparent
in Eq. (5). Operating leverage affects the relation between monopolists’ profits and this
19






. The first one, ∂πq
∂y
= sq, is the direct





i∈A 1−α+ si di)−1, captures that shocks to L are amplified by the demand
multiplier, which itself depends on all active monopolists’ leverages, {si}i∈A. Hence, through
demand externalities, a monopolist’s leverage affects the transmission of productivity shock
L to aggregate demand y, and therefore, the sensitivity of all other monopolists’ profits
to this productivity shock. Via this demand externality channel, firms’ leverage decisions
become interdependent and jointly determine aggregate risk.
We analyze operating leverage decisions, focusing on symmetric equilibria. Specifically,
suppose all monopolists choose non-cooperatively the same operating leverage s at t = 0.




α−s if L ≥ L
T (s)
L if L < LT (s)
. (14)
If monopolist q were to choose operating leverage sq while all other monopolists choose s,
monopolist q would make a profit, and hence, produce when
(1− α− β + sq) y(s, L)− F (sq) ≥ 0, (15)
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or equivalently, when




(α− s) F (sq)1− α− β + sq
+ F (s), LT (s)
}




1− α− β + sq
, LT (s)
}
if sq < s.
. (16)





(1− α− β + sq) y(s∗, L)− F (sq) dL. (17)
The next proposition follows from this condition.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium s∗ defined by
E
[
y|L ≥ LT (s∗)
]
− F ′ (s∗) = 0. (18)
To understand the condition in Eq. (18), note that, from Eq. (17), operating leverage sq
affects monopolist q’s profit through two margins. The first one is an extensive margin:
changing sq affects monopolist q’s production threshold L̂(sq, s∗) at t = 1, namely, the lower
bound of the integral in Eq. (17). The extensive margin, L̂(sq, s∗), does not enter the mo-
nopolist’s first order condition in Eq. (18). Intuitively, at L̂(s∗, s∗) = LT (s∗), monopolist
q’s profit is strictly positive only because other monopolists also produce. As L falls below
LT (s∗) and other monopolists stop producing, monopolist q’s profit from producing turns
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strictly negative, and the monopolist is better off stopping production as well. This holds
when sq = s∗, but also, by continuity, for a range of values of sq below s∗. Conversely, mo-
nopolist q is better off producing at LT (s∗) for a range of values of sq above s∗. The rigidity
of L̂(sq, s∗) with respect to sq around s∗ reflects the strength of strategic complementarities
around the production threshold, which underlines the coordination failure. Consequently,
the only relevant margin is an intensive one: changing sq affects monopolist q’s profit taking
the states in which it produces (i.e., the bounds of the integral in Eq. (17)) as fixed. The
condition in Eq. (18) states that there are no marginal gains in terms of profits along that
intensive margin when monopolist q chooses s∗ and produces for L above LT (s∗) = L̂(s∗, s∗).
Note that this marginal reasoning only provides a necessary condition for optimality. Specif-
ically, gains along the extensive margin become non-negligible as sq moves further away from
s∗. The proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix shows that these large deviations can also
be ruled out.
A key aspect in the above analysis is that the coordination failure at t = 1 is unaffected
by a unilateral change in leverage; that is, the leverage and production decisions of a single
monopolist have a negligible effect on the aggregate income and therefore, on the production
decisions of all the other monopolists at t = 1. We now ask whether welfare could improve if
a social planner were to choose all monopolists’ leverage. Specifically, we define the optimal
leverage sopt as the one maximizing consumers’ expected utility at t = 0 given that monop-
olists behave at t = 1 as per Proposition 1. Our social optimum is therefore constrained
efficient: the social planner chooses leverage at t = 0 but cannot avoid coordination failures
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at t = 1. Note finally that the extra labor income βy earned by supervisors in states in
which monopolists are active merely compensates them for their effort cost and, therefore,
labor income net of monitoring disutility always sums up to L. Consequently, maximizing






(1− α− β + s) y(s, L)− F (s) dL. (19)
Proposition 3. In the symmetric equilibrium, there is excessive operating leverage: s∗ >
sopt.
To understand why equilibrium leverage is excessive, consider the first order derivative of
the social planner objective function in Eq. (19) with respect to s,5
∫ L
LT (s)
y(s, L)− F ′(s) dL+
∫ L
LT (s)






[(1− α− β + s) y(s, LT (s))− F (s)].
(20)
This derivative has three terms. The first one corresponds to the impact of leverage on each
monopolist’s profit, given that a monopolist produces for L ≥ LT (s). From Eq. (18), this
term is zero at s = s∗: each monopolist optimizes along the intensive margin in equilibrium.
The second term captures the demand externality that each monopolist exerts by stimulating
demand y for other active monopolists when L ≥ LT (s). From Eq. (7), the equilibrium
5This is assuming that s is such that LT (s) < L, which holds both in equilibrium and at the social
optimum: it is neither individually nor socially optimal to choose s at t = 0 such that monopolists never
operate at t = 1.
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impact of monopolist q on y is πq+βy times a demand multiplier (α−s∗)−1. (The equilibrium
demand multiplier is (α − s∗)−1 for L ≥ LT (s) and 1 for L < LT (s).) The monopolist
does not internalize that the demand multiplier, (α − s∗)−1, amplifies the contribution of
its profit to output. However, because the equilibrium demand multiplier is constant for
L ≥ LT (s∗), monopolist q, when choosing sq to maximize its expected profit πq along the
intensive margin, also maximizes the expected externality it exerts on other monopolists
across all states L ≥ LT (s∗). As a result, the second term in Eq. (20) also cancels out when





(s∗, L)dL = 0.
The equilibrium inefficiency goes through the impact of leverage on the lower bound of the
monopolists’ production region LT (s), which is captured by the third term in Eq. (20). As
discussed earlier, if a monopolist were to unilaterally lower its leverage marginally, it would
not produce in the neighborhood below LT (s∗) at t = 1, as it anticipates all other monopolists
will remain inactive. However, if a social planner constrains all monopolists to lower their
operating leverage, coordination in production at t = 1 changes: ∂LT (s)
∂s
> 0. Specifically,
at the equilibrium leverage s∗, a marginal decrease in the leverage of all monopolists lead
them to switch from inactivity to production just below LT (s∗). Because LT (s∗) belongs to
the region in which monopolists being inactive is Pareto-dominated, inducing all of them
to produce in that marginal state improves welfare by the corresponding aggregate profit
(1− α− β + s∗) y(s, LT (s∗))− F (s∗) > 0. In other words, if monopolists could collectively
commit to lowering their leverage at t = 0, they would increase their expected profits and
raise welfare by expanding the range of states in which they coordinate on the Pareto-
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superior production decision at t = 1. They, however, have no unilateral incentive to do
so.
It follows from the above discussion, that the excessive leverage result in Proposition 3 is
inherently related to the monopolists’ failure to coordinate production below LT (s) at t = 1.
In fact, our model establishes a direct relationship between the possibility of coordination
failures at t = 1 and the efficiency of the risk-taking decision at t = 0. To see this, consider
the equilibrium in Lemma 1 and instead of applying a global games treatment, suppose mo-
nopolists always coordinate on the Pareto-superior production equilibrium; that is, assuming
that for any common leverage s, firms produce at t = 1 if and only if L ≥ (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s .
Proposition 4. If firms coordinate on the Pareto-superior production equilibrium at t = 1
and a symmetric operating leverage equilibrium exists, it is unique and socially optimal.
Proposition 4 highlights that constrained inefficiency in Proposition 3 is not related to the
monitoring friction per se: equilibrium leverage is socially optimal with β > 0 as long as
monopolists coordinate on the Pareto-superior equilibrium at t = 1. Hence, the possibility
of coordination failures at t = 1, rather than their origin in itself, is what really matters for
the excessive leverage result. In other words, the role in the model of the monitoring cost
β is to create scope for these inefficient production outcomes at t = 1, but other sources of
coordination failures can lead to the same result. Intuitively, absent coordination failures,
the net social value of monopolists producing in the marginal state, that is, at L = (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s ,
is equal to zero. By contrast, the net social value of monopolists producing at LT (s∗)
is strictly positive, which reflects the coordination failure. This strictly positive value at
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LT (s∗) creates the social benefit of lowering aggregate leverage to extend production below
LT (s∗), which monopolists fail to internalize.
The inefficiency in Proposition 3 is a statement on the first moment of the output distribu-
tion: excessive operating leverage causes expected output to be lower in equilibrium than
in the constrained optimum. Our model also shows that this loss in expected output com-
pounds differential effects across states: output is actually higher than in the social optimum
for high realizations of the productivity shock, but lower for low realizations. In addition, the
transition from a Pareto-superior equilibrium with high production to the Pareto-inferior
one with low production occurs through a larger drop in output in equilibrium than in
the constrained optimum. This result is the combination of two forces: first, the econ-
omy is more levered in equilibrium than in the social optimum, s∗ > sopt; and second, the
drop into a low-production regime occurs for a higher realization of the productivity shock,
LT (s∗) > LT (sopt). Summing up, the welfare loss caused by excess leverage occurs through
a shift of the output distribution towards high-productivity states that comes at the cost of
higher downside risk and lower expected output.
3.4. Evidence and empirical implications
In the model, strategic complementarities are associated with demand spillovers, which is
in line with the Keynesian narrative that attributes the bulk of business cycles to shifts in
aggregate demand. Blanchard and Quah (1989) use structural VARs to provide evidence
in support of the idea that business cycles are driven by shifts in aggregate demand. The
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same idea is corroborated by recent work that exploits the regional variation in business
cycles, such as Mian and Sufi (2014) and Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2019). Low aggregate
demand is also considered to be an important force behind the Great Recession and the slow
recovery from it. (See, for instance, Hall, 2011; Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; and Mian,
Rao, and Sufi, 2013.)
The particular way in which firms gain exposure to aggregate shocks in the model, namely
through increasing labor leverage, has the empirical advantage of being more directly ob-
servable when in general, risk-taking by firms is notoriously difficult to identify and may
only be indirectly inferred from the variability of profit measures. Moreover, as we discuss
below, the literature has identified labor leverage as a first-order determinant of firm risk.
The starting points are two simple observations (see the discussion in Danthine and Don-
aldson, 2002): (i) labor costs are typically the main component of firms’ cost structures;
and (ii) labor costs are in large part fixed costs and consequently tend to vary less than
income. For example, Donangelo, Gourio, Kehrig, and Palacios (2019) show that on aver-
age, a 1% reduction in sales leads to a 0.99% reduction in non-labor costs, but only to a
0.69% reduction in labor costs. Our model captures these two features by focusing on labor
as a production factor and by assuming that firms’ organizational and technological choices
generate costs that cannot be readily adjusted to demand shocks. At the same time, it is
important for our results that labor leverage be a decision variable that can be calibrated in
the long run. Holzhacker, Krishnan, and Mahlendorf (2015) and Aboody, Levi, and Weiss
(2018) provide empirical evidence consistent with managers having the ability to rebalance
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operating leverage in response to changes in the regulatory environment. Merz and Yashiv
(2007) present a structural model in which firms’ decisions to adjust their labor force are
subject to a convex adjustment cost. Consistent with our setup, in their model, labor cost
structures are both rigid in the short term and structural decision variables in the long
term. Merz and Yashiv (2007) show that this framework helps to explain the volatility of
firm values.
The link between labor leverage and firm risk is an empirically well-documented relation
that provides support for the transmission channel of the aggregate shock in our model.
Beyond the previously discussed papers Danthine and Donaldson (2002) and Merz and
Yashiv (2007), a growing literature in asset pricing and macro-finance seeks to explain asset
prices through the magnifying impact of labor leverage. Donangelo, Gourio, Kehrig, and
Palacios (2019) show that firms with higher labor leverage are more sensitive to aggregate
shocks, and therefore have stocks with higher expected return. In fact, they argue that
half of the value premium can be explained through labor leverage. While we do not model
capital structure, the risk induced by labor leverage should be embedded into any claim that
is junior to labor obligations, which includes not only equity, but also debt. Consistent with
this idea, Faviloukis, Lin, and Zhao (2020) show that labor leverage forecasts credit spreads
as well as credit risk in the cross-section of firms. The literature has also used structural
breaks to assess the causal relation between labor leverage and firm risk. For instance,
Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) find that firms tend to reduce financial leverage when
employment protection rises; and Serfling (2016) finds that labor protection laws that make
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workers more costly to dismiss cause firms operating profits to be more volatile. Overall,
there is consistent and widespread evidence of the importance of labor leverage for firm
risk. This evidence lends support to the mechanism at play in our model and suggests that
distortions to labor leverage are likely to have a material impact on output and, ultimately,
welfare.
In the paper, the distortion of operating leverage from a constrained optimum is tied to
the possibility of coordination failures across firms. On the positive side, this leads to
novel predictions. First, operating leverage is higher when demand spillovers are more
important. In the model, the monitoring cost β and the compensation associated with
it calibrates the magnitude of demand spillovers when monopolies start producing, and
operating leverage is increasing in β. Identifying these spillovers is then a key empirical
challenge. One possibility is to exploit firms’ geographical locations. For instance, Dougal,
Parsons, and Titman (2014) show that firms’ investments are sensitive to investment by
firms located in the same area even if those firms are in different industries. They argue
this is suggestive of spillovers that could be rooted in consumption externalities between
residents, like those at play in our model. Therefore, variations in geographical location
could be used to proxy for the intensity of these spillover effects, with the caveat that
location is in part endogenous. (See also Tuzel and Zhang, 2017.) Second, the effect of
operating leverage is particularly pervasive when coordination failures are more likely to
arise. Testing this prediction requires measures of firms’ ability to coordinate production
and investment. For instance, common ownership can serve as a coordination device by
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inducing shareholders to internalize the demand externality. Weinstein and Yafeh (1995)
show that Japanese firms that belong to a Keiretsu behave differently from those that do not.
Their results suggest that the pattern of cross-ownership that characterizes these large multi-
industry corporate groups induce them to produce at a higher level than those maximizing
individual firms’ profits, consistent with coordination motives. Recent studies on common
ownership (e.g., Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu, 2018) argue that large institutional investors play
a coordinating role within and across industries. Interestingly, this literature also identifies
plausibly exogenous shocks to common ownership –mergers between asset managers– that
could help with identification. Finally, government intervention and a strong public sector
can also have a role in preventing economic crises by reducing the likelihood of a coordination
failure. For instance, a countercyclical public policy of stimulating the economy in the low
productivity states can have a stabilizing effect by means of coordinating production. The
role of public policy is explored in detail in Section 4 below.
On the normative side, our model predicts that in the presence of demand externalities,
operating leverage is inefficiently high in that expected output is too low. The model also
predicts that this depressed output is related to an excessive exposure of the economy to
recession risk. Taking this prediction to the data would likely require a structural approach,
where one could run counterfactuals and obtain an estimate of the output loss. One step in
that direction are quantitative models of business cycles that embed coordination problems
such as Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2018, 2019). These models can quantitatively
account for the slow recovery that follows large aggregate shocks as agents coordinate on
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inefficient low-output equilibria. Incorporating a labor leverage decision would be the next
step. Nonetheless, there is evidence supporting the idea that volatility is harmful in terms
of economic growth, particularly in developing economies. For instance, Hnatkovska and
Loayza (2005) show that the volatility due to crises has outsized effects on the growth of
developing countries relative to the volatility due to normal fluctuations. More generally,
the relation between recession risk and growth is consistent with a stream of papers initiated
by the finding in Ramey and Ramey (1995) that output volatility and output growth are
negatively correlated.
4. Public policy
This section analyzes the role of public policy: how government intervention at the produc-
tion stage feeds back into firms’ production and operating leverage decisions. Specifically,
we assume the government can intervene at t = 1 to coordinate production among an m-
mass of monopolists where m ∈ [0, 1). The rest of the monopolists, of mass (1 − m), are
as in the baseline model. The m-mass of monopolists differ from the other (1−m)-mass of
monopolists in the economy in two ways. First, the m-mass of monopolists can share their
private signals lq = L + εq with the government which, therefore, learns L perfectly. Sec-
ond, the government can commit to having the m-mass of monopolists produce in a given
set of states –realizations of L– even if producing in some of these states yields negative
profits. In that case, the government could finance these losses through a lump-sum tax.
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Natural interpretations of the m-mass of monopolists are the size of the public sector, the
number of government-controlled firms, or the number of sectors in which the government
has the capacity to influence production decisions, possibly through subsidies or investment
tax credits. Note that this extension nests the baseline model, which corresponds to the
case with m = 0. As in the baseline model, we use global games techniques to pin down
the production strategy of the m-mass of monopolists not controlled by the government,
and we focus on the case in which the noise in the private signals about L vanishes: ε→ 0.
The following proposition characterizes the resulting equilibrium of the production game at
t = 1.
Proposition 5. Suppose all monopolists choose operating leverage s at t = 0. There exists
a government strategy such that when ε→ 0, all monopolists produce if
L ≥ F (s)1− α + s +
β(1−m)F (s)




) ≡ LT (s,m), (21)
and no monopolist produces if L < LT (s,m). The threshold LT (s,m) is strictly decreasing
in m from LT (s, 0) = LT (s), the production threshold in the baseline model in Eq. (13), to
LT (s, 1) = (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s , the Pareto-optimal production threshold.
The main insight of Proposition 5 is that government control over the production of a fraction
m of monopolists alleviates the coordination problem at t = 1 for all monopolists. Indeed,
the government’s commitment to have an m-mass of monopolists produce for L ≥ LT (s,m)
creates a positive demand externality on the other (1 − m)-mass of monopolists, which
induces them to produce as well. Specifically, for L ∈ [LT (s,m), LT (s, 0)), the government’s
commitment shifts the economy from an equilibrium in which no monopolist produces to
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a Pareto-improving equilibrium in which all monopolists produce and are making strictly
positive profits.
Proposition 5 also shows that ifm < 1, the government’s strategy alleviates the coordination







still not producing, which is Pareto-dominated by all monopolists producing. However, the
equilibrium in Proposition 5 is the best government can do at t = 1 to coordinate production.
Corollary 1. Suppose all monopolists choose operating leverage s at t = 0. When ε → 0,
monopolists producing if and only if L ≥ LT (s,m) is constrained efficient at t = 1.
Intuitively, while the government can coordinate production among an m-mass of monopo-
lists, the other (1−m)-mass of monopolists still face a coordination problem. Because of this
coordination problem, the (1−m)-mass of monopolists do not produce below LT (s,m), even
if they expect the m-mass of government-controlled monopolists to produce. Then, given
that the (1 − m)-mass of monopolists never produce below LT (s,m), it is Pareto-optimal
for the government to have the m-mass of monopolists also abstain from producing below
LT (s,m): their producing in that region would generate losses that decrease welfare with
no effect on the behavior of the other (1 − m)-mass of monopolists. Note finally that in
this constrained optimum, no monopolist ever makes losses when it operates, including the
m-mass controlled by the government, and hence no taxation is required in equilibrium. In
that sense, while the government’s commitment to production by the m-mass of monopolists
is useful in shifting the behavior of the (1 −m)-mass of monopolists, it does not generate
costs for the former monopolists or the government.
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We now turn to the choice of operating leverage at t = 0. Monopolists choose their operating
leverage to maximize expected profits. Since all monopolists produce if and only if L ≥
LT (s,m) at t = 1, they all face the same optimization problem at t = 0, which is equivalent
to the one in Eq. (17) except for the fact that now L̂(sq, s∗) depends on threshold LT (s,m).
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium operating leverage at t = 0:




y|L ≥ LT (s∗(m),m)
]
− F ′ (s∗(m)) = 0. (22)
This equilibrium s∗(m) is strictly decreasing in m.
Proposition 6 is equivalent to Proposition 2 in the main model and has the same interpre-
tation. More specifically, similar to condition in Eq. (18), condition in Eq. (22) states that
there are no marginal gains in terms of profits along that intensive margin when monopolist
q chooses s∗(m) and produces for L above LT (s∗(m),m). Proposition 6, however, has the ad-
ditional implication that s∗(m) is decreasing inm. Therefore, the government’s commitment
to inducing production above LT (s,m) at t = 1 has two effects: (i) improving coordination
at t = 1 for a given operating leverage s (i.e., from Proposition 5, LT (s,m) < LT (s, 0) for
m > 0); and (ii) reducing operating leverage at t = 0 (i.e., Proposition 6, s∗(m) < s∗(0) for
m > 0). As we show next, these two effects increase welfare.
Since maximizing welfare is akin to maximizing corporate profits (see Eq. (19)), let W (s,m)






(1− α− β + s)L− F (s)
α− s
− F (s) dL. (23)
Proposition 7 below shows that welfare increases in m.
Proposition 7. W (s∗(m),m) is strictly increasing in m. When m→ 1, operating leverage
and production decisions tend to the first-best optimal.
The intuition for Proposition 7 is directly related to the two above-mentioned effects. First,
the government’s intervention prevents coordination failures in production at t = 1 for
a given s (i.e., ∂W (s,m)
∂m
> 0). Second, the government’s intervention that mitigates the
coordination problem at t = 1 has the additional benefit of curbing excessive operating




> 0). Therefore, a government that can credibly commit to
stimulating the economy in low productivity states has a stabilizing effect by both avoiding
abrupt transitions between high- and low-production regimes ex post and inducing lower
leverage ex ante. Importantly, government intervention at t = 1 can only be fully effective
if it is anticipated at t = 0 and, therefore, if it has the effect of reducing the equilibrium
operating leverage at t = 0. In other words, a lack of credibility to intervene in the future
generates excess operating leverage ex ante, which in turn, magnifies the need for government
intervention ex post. Note also that Proposition 7 is a statement on expected profits, but
the increase in welfare compounds differential effects across states: there is a decrease in
downside risk at the cost of a worse economic performance in high productivity states.
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Overall, our results indicate that public policy can be an efficient instrument to curb risk-
taking and prevent crises. Rodrik (1998) provides evidence consistent with the idea that
government spending plays a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to a significant amount
of external risk.
Finally, note that we have allowed for the government to intervene at t = 1 to coordinate
production but not at t = 0 to lower operating leverage. (The lower operating leverage
at t = 0 when goverment can coordinate production among an m-mass of monopolists at
t = 1, i.e., s∗(m) < s∗(0), is the byproduct of monopolists anticipating a lower production
threshold at t = 1.) In doing so, this section highlights the stabilizing effect that a policy of
stimulating the economy in low-productivity states has by means of coordinating production.
Naturally, however, the excessive leverage result we focus on in the baseline model generalizes
to this extension: lowering all monopolists’ operating leverage from the equilibrium level
in Proposition 7 can also raise welfare. This suggests that another lever for government
intervention would be to directly induce the m-mass of monopolists to lower their operating
leverage to below the equilibrium level in Proposition 7.
5. Discussion
5.1. Sources of coordination failure
As previously discussed, the role of the monitoring friction is to generate equilibrium multi-
plicity and the possibility of a coordination failure at the production stage. Our assumption
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is isomorphic to one in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) but it also lends itself to a
natural extension in which workers perceive a rent.6 Suppose that when supervisors do not
exert effort, there is now a small but strictly positive probability p that the product is func-
tional. In that case, if supervisors are protected by limited liability, incentivizing monitoring
requires leaving each supervisor with a pay equal to β/(1−p) > β per unit, which is strictly
higher than the supervisor’s monitoring cost. The severity of the moral hazard friction (i.e.,
the magnitude of this rent) aggravates equilibrium inefficiencies through two channels. First,
a higher rent makes monopolists more likely to coordinate on the non-productive equilib-
rium at t = 1. This is because monopolists internalize the rent as a real cost, while it
merely is a redistribution of surplus from shareholders to workers. The higher incidence of
coordination failures at t = 1 lowers consumers’ expected utility, keeping operating lever-
age constant. Second, the incremental production inefficiency at t = 1 induces monopolists
to increase their operating leverage at t = 0. Intuitively, more frequent coordination fail-
ures make all monopolists less likely to survive a bad shock, which increases the weight of
high-productivity states in each monopolist’s leverage optimization problem. As a result,
equilibrium operating leverage moves further away from the social optimum, amplifying the
ex post production inefficiency and depressing welfare. The following proposition formalizes
this discussion.
Proposition 8. In any symmetric equilibrium, there is excessive operating leverage, and an
6 In our setup, monopolist q makes profit π(xq) = pqxq(1 − β) − [(α− sq)xq + F (sq)]. If we rewrite




= 11−β − 1
)
would correspond to the wage premium in
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989).
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increase in p increases operating leverage and decreases welfare.
Proposition 8 establishes that rents increase operating leverage and decrease welfare by
creating a misalignment between firms’ objective functions and consumers’ welfare. Note
that this misalignment aggravates the inefficiency in risk-taking but is not necessary to
generate it. As Proposition 3 shows, even when rents are absent (p = 0) and maximizing
aggregate corporate profits coincide with maximizing consumers’ welfare (see Eq. (19)), the
coordination problem between firms persists, which makes production and operating leverage
decisions suboptimal.
Finally, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) provide other mechanisms beyond moral hazard
that lead to equilibrium multiplicity in the presence of demand externalities, for instance,
when firms invest to generate future labor savings. Therefore, while our modelling choice is
both technically convenient as well economically relevant –information frictions are pervasive
in large organizations–, it is not the only way to generate a coordination failure in the context
of the modelled economy. Moreover, as emphasized by Proposition 4, the excessive operating
leverage at t = 0 is caused by the coordination failure at t = 1 in itself, rather than by the
specific origin of the coordination failure.
5.2. State-dependent multiplier
In our model, the inefficiency operates through the impact that monopolists’ leverage de-
cisions have on the probability of a coordination failure, that is, it operates through the
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extensive margin. However, monopolists’ leverage decisions also affect each other’s prof-
itability in every state L ≥ LT (s∗) in which they produce, that is, it affects the intensive
margin. So far, the incentives of monopolists and the social planner have been aligned along
the intensive margin because the demand multiplier has been constant across all states in
which monopolists produce. (See Eq. (20) and the discussion that follows.) Shleifer and
Vishny (1988) show that a misalignment of public and private incentives to produce can
arise along the intensive margin if the demand multiplier is not constant across states. By
shutting down this channel, our model is designed to isolate the effect of ex post coordina-
tion failures on ex ante risk-taking (Proposition 3). We explore next how a misalignment
along the intensive margin would affect operating leverage decisions.
As will become clear below, one way to endogenously make the demand multiplier state-
contingent is to introduce heterogeneity among monopolists.7 Specifically, we assume that
all monopolists have the same fixed cost, F (sq) = sqα−sq , but a proportion ni of monopolists
have marginal cost α + ∆i − sq, where i = 1, 2, ni + nj = 1, α + ∆i < 1, and ∆1 6= ∆2. To
isolate the effect of heterogeneity on operating leverage decisions, we rule out coordination
failures at the production stage by assuming that β = 0. The next proposition characterizes
the efficiency of the equilibrium operating leverage at t = 0.
Proposition 9. Any symmetric equilibrium in which type-i monopolists choose s∗i is con-
strained inefficient: the equilibrium features insufficient operating leverage in that increasing
7The effect of firm heterogeneity on the demand multiplier is as in Shleifer and Vishny (1988). However,
their model studies inefficiencies at the production stage and relies on firms making production decisions
before the productivity shock L is realized. In our model, L is known when firms make production decisions,
but unknown when firms choose operating leverage.
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operating leverage for the monopolists with the lowest production threshold increases welfare.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 9, note first that, since there are no coor-
dination failures at t = 1 (β = 0), production is ex post efficient. As a result, monopolists’
and social planer’s incentives to take on operating leverage are aligned along the extensive
margin. However, private and public incentives no longer align along the intensive mar-
gin. While in the main model all monopolists have the same operating threshold, here,
the production threshold depends on the monopolist’s type. Assume without loss of gen-
erality that type-i monopolists have a lower production threshold LTi than type-j monop-
olists LTj , that is, for L ∈ [LTi , LTj ) only type-i monopolists operate while for L ∈ [LTj , L]
both types operate. This implies that the demand multiplier is no longer constant across
states in which a monopolist is active: it is equal to (1 − ni(1 − α − ∆i + s∗i ))−1 for
L ∈ [LTi , LTj ) and (1− ni(1− α −∆i + s∗i )− nj(1− α −∆j + s∗j))−1 for L ∈ [LTj , L]. Since
(1−ni(1−α−∆i+s∗i )−nj(1−α−∆j +s∗j))−1 > (1−ni(1−α−∆i+s∗i ))−1, a marginal unit
of profit has a higher welfare impact when L ∈ [LTj , L] than when L ∈ [LTi , LTj ). As a result,
maximizing expected profit is no longer equivalent to maximizing expected welfare. Relative
to a monopolist, a social planner has a higher willingness to shift profits from [LTi , LTj ) to
[LTj , L] because the welfare impact per unit of profit is higher in [LTj , L] than in [LTi , LTj ).
This is exactly what higher operating leverage achieves.8
8While Proposition 9 shows that increasing s∗i (the operating leverage of the monopolists with the
lower production threshold) given s∗j (the operating leverage of the monopolists with the higher production
threshold) increases welfare, s∗j is optimal given s∗i . The reason is that the equilibrium demand multiplier is
constant across all states in which type-j monopolists are active (i.e., the demand multiplier is (1− ni(1−
α − ∆i + s∗i ) − nj(1 − α − ∆j + s∗j ))−1 for all L ∈ [LTj , L]). Therefore, type-j monopolists, maximizing
expected profit in L ∈ [LTj , L] is equivalent to maximizing expected welfare.
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Overall, contrasting the insufficient leverage result in Proposition 9 with our main result
of excessive leverage in Proposition 3 stresses that coordination failures have a distinct di-
rectional effect on ex ante risk-taking decisions. While the analysis in the current section
suggests that risk-taking decisions can be distorted in more than one way, the importance of
the excessive leverage result of Proposition 3 is commensurate to the role that coordination
failures play in explaining crises and recessions, as discussed at the end of Section 3. In
that sense, the inefficiencies in Proposition 3 and Proposition 9 speak to different concerns
about the distribution of output across states of the economy. In Proposition 9, insufficient
leverage prevents the economy from fully exploiting demand spillovers after a positive pro-
ductivity shock, while in Proposition 3, excessive leverage makes the economy too exposed
to a negative productivity shock. To the extent that recessions and crises inflict material
and long-lasting damages, that second channel ought to be of particular significance.
5.3. Operating leverage specification
In the paper, firms decide their cost structure by trading off higher fixed labor costs for lower
variable costs. Specifically, monopolist q incurs a fixed cost of F (sq) = sqα−sq units of labor
and a constant marginal cost of α− sq units of labor per unit of output, where sq ∈ [0, α] is
choice variable that captures operating leverage. The function F (sq) is increasing, convex,
and tends to infinity as sq → α, which guarantees that the equilibrium operating leverage
s∗ is smaller than α (and hence, that variable costs are positive).
Because the monopolist’s optimization problem with respect to sq in Eq. (17) is not convex,
41
local optimality conditions are not sufficient for global optimality, and large deviations also
need to be ruled out. The function we chose for F (sq), sqα−sq , provides the necessary ana-
lytical tractability for studying large deviations to determine existence. (See the proof of
Proposition 2 in the Appendix.) However, the local necessary condition that characterizes
the equilibrium in Proposition 2 holds for a generic increasing and convex function. More-
over, around this local equilibrium condition, there is excessive operating leverage, as in
Proposition 3. The logic is also identical to the one previously discussed for Proposition 3:
at the equilibrium leverage s∗, a marginal decrease in the leverage of all monopolists lead
them to switch from inactivity to production just below LT (s∗) (i.e., ∂LT (s∗)
∂s
> 0), which im-
proves welfare. This highlights once again that the excessive leverage result is driven by the
monopolists’ failure to coordinate production below LT (s∗) at t = 1, and not by the chosen
functional form for the fixed cost. The following proposition formalizes this discussion.
Proposition 10. Consider a generic increasing and convex function F (.), any symmetric
interior equilibrium s∗ at t = 1 satisfies condition in Eq. (18) in Proposition 2, and a
collective marginal decrease in operating leverage around s∗ increases welfare.
6. Conclusion
Coordination failures are often invoked to explain periods of recession and crises in which
economies appear to be trapped in down-cycles of low output, trading, and investment.
In essence, the literature views economies as interdependent systems in which agents need
to coordinate their investment and consumption decisions. We show that these economies
42
feature excessive operating leverage as firms do not internalize the effect that their risk
choices have on the probability of the economy suffering a coordination failure. The excessive
operating leverage increases downside risk and causes expected output to be lower than
in the social optimum. The loss in expected output compounds differential effects across
states: There is a shift in output towards high-productivity states that comes at the cost of
more frequent and severe economic crises. The analysis has implications for public policy: a
countercyclical policy that stimulates the economy in low productivity states has a stabilizing
effect by both, avoiding coordination failures ex post and curving excessive risk ex ante.
While our model emphasizes the role of demand externalities because of its economic impor-
tance, strategic complementarities across economic agents have been shown to arise through
a broad variety of channels (e.g., thick market externalities, technological complementari-
ties, and imperfect information). These other sources of strategic complementarities can also
generate multiple equilibria and create scope for coordination failures. In general, we expect
the same economic forces to apply in setups with these alternative sources. Indeed, as long
as risk increases the probability of a coordination failure and agents do not internalize this
effect, agents will tend to engage in excessive risk-taking.
Strategic complementarities are notably important in the financial system as illustrated by
recurrent financial crises. Specifically, the liquidity transformation role of financial insti-
tutions combined with the fact that these institutions form a highly interconnected net-
work makes financial systems particularly vulnerable to coordination failures. Our analysis
suggests that a concentrated financial system is more stable in that financial institutions
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internalize, to a larger extent, the effect that their risk choices have on the probability of a
systemic financial crisis. Alternatively, it also suggests that a more disperse financial system
requires stricter regulation to curve excessive risk-taking. The analysis of these effects in
the specific context of an economy with a financial system is an interesting avenue for future
research.
References
Aboody, D., Levi, S., Weiss, G., 2018. Managerial incentives, options, and cost-structure
choices. Review of Accounting Studies 23, pp. 422–451.
Azar, J., Schmalz, M., Tecu, I., 2018. Anticompetitive effects of common ownership. Journal
of Finance 73, pp. 1513–1565.
Bebchuk, L., Goldstein, I., 2011. Self-fulfilling credit market freezes. Review of Financial
Studies 24, pp. 3519–3555.
Beraja, M., Hurst, E., Ospina, J., 2019. The aggregate implications of regional business
cycles. Econometrica 87, pp. 1789-1833
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., 1989. Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctuations. Amer-
ican Economic Review 79, pp. 14–31.
Blanchard, O., Quah, D., 1989. The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply dis-
turbances. American Economic Review 79, pp. 655–673.
Carlsson, H., Van Damme, E., 1993. Global payoff uncertainty and risk dominance. Econo-
44
metrica 61, pp. 989–1018.
Chamley, C., 1999. Regime switches. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, pp. 869–905.
Chaney, T., Ossa, R., 2013. Market size, division of labor, and firm productivity. Journal of
International Economics 90, pp. 177–180.
Cooper, R., John, A., 1988. Coordinating coordination failures in keynesian models. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 103, pp. 441–463.
Danthine, J., Donaldson, J., 2002. Labour relations and asset returns. Review of Economic
Studies 69, pp. 41–64.
Diamond, P., 1982. Aggregate demand management in search equilibrium. Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 91, pp. 401–409.
Donangelo, A., Gourio, F., Kehrig, M., Palacios, M., 2019. The cross-section of labor leverage
and equity returns. Journal of Financial Economics 132, pp. 497–518.
Dougal, C., Parsons, C., Titman, S., 2014. Urban vibrancy and corporate growth. Journal
of Finance 70, pp. 163–210.
Eggertsson, G., Krugman, P., 2012. Debt, deleveraging, and the liquidity trap: a Fisher-
Minsky-Koo approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics 127, pp. 1469–1513.
Faviloukis, J., Lin, X., Zhao, X., 2020. The elephant in the room: the impact of labor
obligations on credit risk. American Economic Review 110, pp. 1673–1712.
Garicano, L., Van Zandt, T., 2012. Hierarchies and the division of labor. In: Handbook of
Organizational Economics, edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, Princeton University
Press.
45
Gorton, G., Ordoñez, G., 2014. Collateral crises. American Economic Review 104, pp. 343–
378.
Guimaraes, B., Morris, S., 2008. Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks.
Journal of Monetary Economics 54, pp. 2205–2230.
Hall, R., 2011. The long slump. American Economic Review 101, pp. 431–469.
Hart, O., 1982. A model of imperfect competition with Keynesian features. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 97, pp. 109–138.
He, Z., Kondor, P., 2016. Inefficient investment waves. Econometrica 84, pp. 735-780.
Hnatkovska, V., Loayza, N., 2005. Volatility and growth. In: Managing Economic Volatility
and Crises, edited by J. Aizenmann and B. Pinto, Cambridge University Press.
Holzhacker, M., Krishnan. R., Mahlendorf, M., 2015. The impact of changes in regulation
on cost behavior. Contemporary Accounting Research, 32, pp. 534–566.
Kiyotaki, N., 1988. Multiple expectations equilibria under monopolistic competition. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 103, pp, 695-714.
Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., 1997, Credit cycles, Journal of Political Economy 105, pp, 211–248.
Lamont, O., 1995. Corporate-debt overhang and macroeconomic expectations. American
Economic Review 85, pp. 1106–1117.
Lev, B., 1974. On the association between operating leverage and risk. Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis 9, pp. 627–641.
Lorenzoni, G., 2008. Inefficient credit booms. Review of Economic Studies 75, pp. 809–833.
Maskin, E., Tirole, J., 1988. A theory of dynamic oligopoly, I: overview and quantity com-
46
petition with large fixed costs. Econometrica 56, pp. 549–569.
Merz, M., Yashiv, E., 2007. Labor and the market value of the firm. American Economic
Review 97, pp. 1419–1431.
Mian, A., Rao, K., Sufi, A., 2013. Household balance sheets, consumption, and the economic
slump. Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, pp.1687–1726.
Mian, A., Sufi, A., 2014. What explains high unemployment? The aggregate demand chan-
nel. Econometrica 82, pp. 2197–2223.
Morris, S., Shin, H., 2000. Rethinking multiple equilibria in macroeconomics. NBERMacroe-
conomics Annual 2000, MIT Press.
Morris, S., Shin, H., 2003. Global games: theory and applications. In: Advances in Eco-
nomics and Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric
Society), edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, S. Turnovsky, Cambridge University Press.
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1989. Industrialization and the big push. Journal of
Political Economy 97, pp. 1003–1026.
Ramey, G., Ramey, V., 1995. Cross-country evidence on the link between volatility and
growth. American Economic Review 85, pp. 1138–1151.
Rodrik, D., 1998. Why do more open economies have bigger governments? Journal of
Political Economy 106, pp. 997–1032.
Rosenstein-Rodan, P., 1943. Problems of industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe. The Economic Journal 53, pp. 202–211.
Schaal, E., Taschereau-Dumouchel, M., 2018. Coordinating business cycles. Unpublished
47
working paper. Cornell University.
Schaal, E., Taschereau-Dumouchel, M., 2019. Aggregate demand and the dynamics of un-
employment. Unpublished working paper. Cornell University.
Serfling, M., 2016. Firing costs and capital structure decisions. Journal of Finance 71, pp.
2239–2286.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1988. The efficiency of investment in the presence of aggregate
demand spillovers. Journal of Political Economy 96, pp. 1221–1231.
Simintzi, E., Vig, V., Volpin, P., 2015. Labor protection and leverage. Review of Financial
Studies 28, pp. 561–591.
Tuzel, S., Zhang, M., 2017. Local risk, local factors, and asset prices. Journal of Finance 72,
pp. 325–370.
Weinstein, D., Yafeh, Y., 1995. Japan’s corporate groups: collusion or competitive? An
empirical investigation of Keiretsu behavior. Journal of Industrial Economics 43, issue 4,
p. 359-76.
Weitzman, M., 1982. Increasing returns and the foundations of unemployment theory. Eco-
nomic Journal 92, pp. 787–804.
48
Appendix
To ensure the existence of equilibria in which agents’ optimization problems have interior
solutions, we assume throughout this Appendix that the upper bound L is large enough, in
a sense we make precise in the proofs below. For most of our results, this assumption boils
down to L > 2.
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose all firms choose s, and firm q observes a noisy signal of L: a signal lq = L+ξq where
ξq is uniform on [−ε, ε]. Suppose firm q produces iff lq > l∗. Then, for a given realization of
L, the number of firms that produce is
n(L) ≡

1 if L > l∗ + ε
L+ε−l∗
2ε if L ∈ [l
∗ − ε, l∗ + ε]
0 if L < l∗ − ε
(A.1)





(1− α− β + s) L− n(L)F1− n(L)(1− α + s) − F dL = 0. (A.2)
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Consider the following change of variable: z = L+ε−l∗2ε ⇔ L = 2εz+ l






(1− α− β + s)2εz + l
∗ − ε− n(2εz + l∗ − ε)F
1− n(2εz + l∗ − ε)(1− α + s) − F
}




(1− α− β + s)2εz + l
∗ − ε− zF
1− z(1− α + s) − F dz = 0. (A.4)




(1− α− β + s) L
T (s)− zF
1− z(1− α + s) − F dz = 0 (A.5)
⇔ 1− α− β + s1− α + s
∫ 1
0
(1− α + s)LT (s)− z(1− α + s)F
1− z(1− α + s) dz − F = 0 (A.6)
⇔ 1− α− β + s1− α + s
∫ 1
0
(1− α + s)LT (s)− F
1− z(1− α + s) dz −
β
1− α + sF = 0 (A.7)
⇔ −1− α− β + s(1− α + s)2
[
(1− α + s)LT (s)− F
]
ln(α− s)− β1− α + sF = 0. (A.8)
Therefore
LT (s) = F1− α + s +
βF





It is apparent that the RHS of Eq. (A.4) is increasing in l∗, which guarantees the unique-
ness of an equilibrium in threshold strategies for any ε. Now, iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies ensure global uniqueness in a setting with global strategic complemen-
tarities (see, e.g., Morris and Shin, 2003). One potential concern here is that monopolists’





≥ 0⇔ L ≥ F (s)1− α + s. (A.10)
Note however, that
F (s)
1− α + s <
(1− β)F (s)
1− α− β + s, (A.11)
i.e., the region where the firms’ actions are not strategic complement is strictly smaller than
the upper bound of the lower-dominance region. Therefore if
2ε < (1− β)F (s)1− α− β + s −
F (s)
1− α + s, (A.12)
a private signal lq consistent with L ≥ (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s rules out L <
F (s)
1−α+s (i.e., ensures that L is
in the region where actions are complement). This, in turn, allows to apply the standard
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. It follows that the threshold equilibrium
derived in Eq. (A.4) is the unique equilibrium for ε small enough, hence when ε→ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Part I. Proof of Proposition 2: Local Conditions.
Suppose monopolist q chooses sq and all other monopolists choose s∗ ∈ (0, α).
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(a) If no other monopolist operate, monopolist q operates if
L > L−(sq) ≡
F (sq)
1− α− β + sq
. (A.13)
Since (i) α+β < 1, L′−(sq) > 0; (ii) β > 0, L−(s∗) > LT (s∗) (from Eq. (A.9)); and (iii)
L−(0) = 0 < LT (s∗), there is a unique s− such that L−(s−) = LT (s∗) and s− < s∗.
If L < LT (s∗) and sq < s−, q operates iff L > L−(sq). If L < LT (s∗) and sq > s−, q
never operates.
(b) If all other monopolist operate, monopolist q operates if
L > L+(sq) ≡ (α− s∗)
F (sq)
1− α− β + sq
+ F (s∗), (A.14)
Since (i) L′+(sq) > 0; (ii) β > 0, L+(s∗) < LT (s∗) (from Eq. (A.9)); and lims→α L+(s) =
+∞, there is a unique s+ < α such that L+(s+) = LT (s∗) and s+ > s∗. If L > LT (s∗)
and sq > s+, q operates iff L > L+(sq). If L > LT (s∗) and sq < s+, q always operates.
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(a) and (b) implies that
L ≥ L̂(sq, s∗) ≡

(α− s∗) F (sq)1− α− β + sq
+ F (s∗) if sq ≥ s+,
LT (s∗) if sq ∈ (s∗, s+),
LT (s∗) if sq ∈ (s−, s∗),
F (sq)
1− α− β + sq
if sq ≤ s−.
(A.15)





(1− α− β + sq) y(s∗, L)− F (sq) dL, (A.16)









y|L ≥ LT (s∗)
]









− F ′(s∗) = 0 (A.18)
⇔ L = 1
α− s∗
2(α + s∗)− s∗1− α + s∗ − βs
∗







If s∗ = 0, the RHS of Eq. (A.19)) is equal to 2. If s∗ → α, the RHS of Eq. (A.19) tends to
+∞. It follows that if L > 2, Eq. (A.19) has at least one solution. Rewrite, Eq. (A.19) as
αL = 2α + s∗







Since f ′(.) > 0 and lims→α f(s) = 1 + L > 0 implies there exists ŝ (possibly equal to 0)
such that f(s) > 0 iff s > ŝ. L > 2 implies that at s = 0, the RHS is lower than 2α and
therefore, s ∈ [0, ŝ) cannot be a solution to Eq. (A.20) since for s ∈ [0, ŝ), the RHS is also
lower than 2α. If s > ŝ, then f(s) > 0 and f ′(s) > 0 imply that the RHS of Eq. (A.20)
is strictly increasing. Therefore, Eq. (A.20) has a unique solution. Hence, if there exists a
symmetric equilibrium, this equilibrium is unique, interior (i.e., s∗ ∈ (0, α)) and defined by
the f.o.c. in Eq. (A.17).
The first-order condition in Eq. (A.17) gives a necessary condition for a symmetric equilib-
rium to exists as otherwise firm q would have incentive to deviate locally from s∗. Next we
analyze the possibility of non-local deviations from s∗ by firm q.
Part II. Proof of Proposition 2: Large Deviations
*Consider first a deviation to sq < s∗.
Reminder: let s− ∈ (0, s∗] be the unique solution to L−(s−) = LT (s∗), where L−(.) is defined
in Eq. (A.13). If β > 0 then s− < s∗, and
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- if sq ≤ s−, then q invests iff L ≥ L−(sq) = F (sq)1−α−β+sq ,
- if sq > s−, then q invests iff L ≥ LT (s∗).




(1− α− β + sq)
L− F (s∗)
α− s∗




(1− α− β + sq)L− F (sq) dL.
(A.21)








− F ′(sq) dL+
∫ LT (s∗)
min{L−(sq),LT (s∗)}
L− F ′(sq) dL. (A.22)
Two observations:





− F ′(sq) dL > 0 (A.23)
since F ′′ > 0. Therefore, monopolist q does not deviate an sq ∈ [s−, s∗).
2. π′(.) is continuous (though not differentiable at s−), which implies that when sq → s−
from below, π′(sq) > 0.





F ′′(sq) dL− [L−(sq)− F ′(sq)]L′−(sq) (A.24)
= −[L− L−(sq)]F ′′(sq) +
[F ′(sq)− L−(sq)]2
1− α− β + sq
, (A.25)
where we are using (and will use repeatedly) that
L′−(sq) =
(1− α− β + sq)F ′(sq)− F (sq)
(1− α− β + sq)2
= F
′(sq)− L−(sq)
1− α− β + sq
. (A.26)




= −L+ L−(sq) +
[F ′(sq)− L−(sq)]2





1− α− β + sq
+ 2[F
′(sq)− L−(sq)][F ′′(sq)− L
′
−(sq)](1− α− β + sq)F ′′(sq)
[F ′′(sq)(1− α− β + sq)]2
− [F
′(sq)− L−(sq)]2 [F ′′′(sq)(1− α− β + sq) + F ′′(sq)]




Since F ′(sq) > L−(sq), G′(sq) has the sign of
[F ′′(sq)]2(1− α− β + sq) (A.29)
+ 2[F ′′(sq)− L′−(sq)](1− α− β + sq)F ′′(sq)
− [F ′(sq)− L−(sq)] [F ′′′(sq)(1− α + sq) + F ′′(sq)]
=3[F ′′(sq)]2(1− α− β + sq)− 2[F ′(sq)− L−(sq)]F ′′(sq) (A.30)
− [F ′(sq)− L−(sq)] [F ′′′(sq)(1− α− β + sq) + F ′′(sq)]
=3[F ′′(sq)]2(1− α− β + sq) (A.31)




(1− α− β + sq)−
6α2
(α− sq)6





+ 6αs(α− s)4(1− α− β + sq)
,
which, in turn has the sign of
g(sq) ≡ α(1− α− β + sq)2 − (1− α− β)(α− sq)2 (A.33)
There are two possible cases:
(I) 2α + β − 1 ≤ 0
Then g(.) is concave, g(α) > 0 and g(0) ≥ 0, therefore, g(.) > 0 for sq ∈ (0, s−). It
follows that π′′ is increasing for sq = 0 and is strictly increasing for s ∈ (0, s−).
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(II) 2α + β − 1 > 0 Then g(.) is convex, g(α) > 0 and g(0) < 0. It follows that π′′(.) is
first decreasing, then increasing on [0, α).
N.B.: π′(0) > 0 and π′′(s−) < 0 is then sufficient to rule out the deviation.
Indeed, in (I), π′′(s−) < 0 and π′′ increasing imply π′′(.) < 0 on [0, s−). Then since π′(s−) >
0, π′(.) > 0 on [0, s−).
In (II), π′′(s−) < 0 implies either π′′(.) < 0 on [0, s−) (then back to previous case), or π′′(.)
is first positive and then negative. Then since π′(0) > 0 and π′(s−) > 0, π′(.) > 0 on [0, s−).
Sufficient conditions for π′(0) > 0 and π′′(s−) < 0:
i) π′(0) > 0 is true if L is large enough, for instance L > 2
α
is sufficient.
ii) π′′(s−) < 0 :
From Eq. (A.19), if L → +∞ then s∗ → α, and L(α − s∗) → 3α. In addition, if L → +∞
then LT (s∗) → +∞ which implies L−(s−) → +∞, which implies s− → α. Finally, by
definition, L−(s−) = LT (s∗):
L−(s−)(α− s∗) =
s−
(α− s−)(1− α− β + s−)
(α− s∗) = LT (s∗)(α− s∗) (A.34)
⇔ s−1− α− β + s−
L(α− s∗) = LT (s∗)(α− s∗)L(α− s−) (A.35)
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Next, from Eq. (A.25):
π′′(s−) =− [L− L−(s−)]F ′′(s−) +
[F ′(s−)− L−(s−)]2













− s−(α− s−)(1− α− β + s−)
]2
,






















1− β = −
3α2
1− β < 0, (A.40)
when L→ +∞. Therefore there exists L̂ such that if L > L̂, π′′(s−) < 0.
This concludes the proof that monopolist q does not deviate to sq ∈ [0, s−).
*Consider now a deviation to sq > s∗.
Monopolist q continues if L ≥ max{(α− s∗) F (sq)1−α−β+sq +F (s
∗), LT (s∗)}. The monopolist will
not deviate to a sq > s∗ such that (α− s∗) F (sq)1−α−β+sq + F (s
∗) ≤ LT (s∗) as Eq. (A.17) implies
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(1− α− β + sq)− F (sq) dL = 0. (A.41)
Consider a large deviation such that (α − s∗) F (sq)1−α−β+sq + F (s











(1− α− β + sq)− F (sq) dL, (A.42)








− F ′ (sq) dL, (A.43)
which also writes as










1− α− β + sq
− F ′ (sq)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Ψ(sq)
 . (A.44)
Therefore since L > (α − s∗) F (sq)1−α−β+sq − F (s
∗) (i.e., monopolist will never deviate to a sq
where never produces):










Since LT (s∗) > (α− s∗) F (s∗)1−α−β+s∗ + F (s






LT (s∗)− F (s∗)
α− s∗






























⇒ αF (s∗) < s∗L⇒ α
α− s∗
< L, (A.49)










T (s∗) = α + s
∗
α− s∗













s2q + α (1− β − α)





s2q + α (1− β − α)
)
(α− sq)− 4α(1− α− β + sq)2
2(1− α− β + sq)2(α− sq)2
(A.52)
=
−s3q − 3αs2q − 9α (1− β − α) sq + 9α2 (1− β)− 4α (1− β)
2 − 5α3
2(1− α− β + sq)2(α− sq)2
(A.53)
which implies that if Ψ′(ŝ) < 0 then Ψ′(sq) < 0 for all sq > ŝ, and therefore, that Ψ(s∗) >
Ψ(sq) for all sq > s∗. Since Ψ(s∗) > Ψ(sq) for all sq > s∗, from Eq. (A.47), it follows that








< 0 for all sq > s∗, (A.54)
and therefore, there are no incentives to deviate to an sq > s∗ such that (α− s∗) F (sq)1−α−β+sq +
F (s∗) > LT (s∗). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3





(1− α− β + s)L− F (s)
α− s
− F (s) dL (A.55)
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(1− α− β + s)L







Consider the three above terms in turn






is 0 at s∗ and strictly negative for s > s∗.














− F ′(s), (A.57)
which, as above, is 0 at s∗ and strictly negative for s > s∗.
- Finally, ∂LT (s)
∂s
> 0 and, at the operating threshold (i.e., at L = LT (s)) firms make a
strictly positive profit:
(1− α− β + s)L
T (s)− F (s)
α− s
− F (s) > 0 (A.58)
for any s.
It follows, that first-order derivative in Eq. (A.56) is negative for any s ≥ s∗, that is, in
equilibrium there is excessive risk-taking. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that for any (common) leverage s, monopolists coordinate on the Pareto-superior
equilibrium in the production game, that is, from Eq. (9) monopolists produce at t = 1 if
and only if
L ≥ L+(s) ≡ (1− β) F (s)1− α− β + s. (A.59)
Consider a deviation by monopolist q: monopolist q chooses sq when all other monopolists
choose leverage s. Monopolist q produces if and only if





1− α− β + sq
, L+(s)
}
if sq < s
(α− s) F (sq)1− α− β + sq
+ F (s) if sq ≥ s
(A.60)











Since L+(s, s) = L+(s), and for any s,
L+(s)− F (s)
α− s
(1− α− β + s)− F (s) = 0, (A.62)
a marginal change in sq around s∗ only affects the integral in Eq. (A.61) through its inte-
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− F ′(s∗) = 0 (A.64)
⇔L = 2(α− s∗)F ′(s∗) +
(
2− 1− β1− α− β + s∗
)
F (s∗) (A.65)
If s∗ = 0, the RHS of Eq. (A.65) is equal to 2. If s∗ → α, the RHS of Eq. (A.65) tends to
+∞. It follows that if L > 2, Eq. (A.65) has at least one solution. Rewrite Eq. (A.65) as
Lα = 2α + s∗
(





Since h′(.) > 0 and lims→α h(s) = L + 1 > 0, there exists ŝ (possibly equal to 0) such that
h(s) > 0 iff s > ŝ. L > 2 implies that at s = 0, the RHS is lower than 2α and therefore,
s ∈ [0, ŝ) cannot be a solution to Eq. (A.66) since for s ∈ [0, ŝ), the RHS is also lower than
2α. If s > ŝ, then h(s) > 0 and h′(s) > 0 imply that the RHS of Eq. (A.66) is strictly
increasing. Therefore, Eq. (A.66) has a unique solution. Hence, if there exists a symmetric
equilibrium, this equilibrium is unique, interior (i.e., s∗ ∈ (0, α)) and defined by the f.o.c. in
Eq. (A.63).
As explained in the main text, maximizing consumers’ expected utility amounts to maximiz-









y(s, L)(1− α− β + s)− F (s) dL, (A.67)
where, as earlier, y(s, L) = L−F (s)
α−s . Since at the social optimum s
∗∗, L+(s∗∗) < L, and using











−F ′ (s∗∗) + y(s∗∗, L)
(α− s∗∗) (1− α− β + s




y(s∗∗, L)− F ′ (s∗∗) dL = 0 (A.70)
Therefore, Eq. (A.70) holds at s∗∗ = s∗ (i.e., the equilibrium leverage satisfies the first-order
condition of the social planner). Notice also that (i) as s → α then L+(s) → +∞ and the
objective function in Eq. (A.67)→ 0; and (ii) if L > 2, the first derivative (see Eq. (A.70))





















then there is at interior optimum s∗∗ ∈ (0, α), which needs to satisfy f.o.c. in Eq. (A.70).
Since Eq. (A.63) and Eq. (A.70) coincide, and since we showed above that there is a unique
interior solution, s∗, to Eq. (A.63), it follows that s∗∗ = s∗. In words, if there is a symmetric
equilibrium, it is unique and maximizes welfare. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Consider first the case where the government commits to have the m-mass of monopolists
produce for L ≥ (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s , that is, whenever it is Pareto-optimal for all monopolists to
produce. (It would never be optimal to commit to produce below (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s as in such case,
the m-mass of monopolists would exert a negative demand externality on the rest of the
economy: when L < (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s , monopolists would be making a loss with probability one.)
Turn to the other (1−m)-mass of monopolist. As in Proposition 1, assume that monopolist




1 if L > l∗ + ε
m+ (1−m)L+ε−l∗2ε if L ∈ [l
∗ − ε, l∗ + ε]
0 if L < l∗ − ε
(A.72)





(1− α− β + s) L− n(L)F1− n(L)(1− α + s) − F dL = 0. (A.73)
Eq. (A.73) implicitly defines a unique l∗(ε), which is strictly greater than (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s for m ∈
[0, 1). (For ε small enough, l∗(ε)− ε is also strictly greater than (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s .) Note that under
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the government’s proposed strategy (i.e., to coordinate production among the m-mass of
monopolists when L ≥ (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s ), improved coordination comes at the cost of losses for L
close enough to (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s from above: in the absence of positive demand externalities from the
(1−m)-mass of monopolists, production by them-mass of monopolists for L close to (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s
carries a loss. To mitigate this problem, suppose that instead of producing for L ≥ (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s ,
government commits to produce for L ≥ l∗(ε)− ε where l∗(ε) is still defined by Eq. (A.73).
Note that investing if and only if lq > l∗(ε) still is the unique equilibrium of the production
game among the (1−m)-mass of monopolists. Next we characterized l∗(ε) as ε→ 0. Start





(1− α− β + s)2εz + l
∗ − ε− (m+ (1−m)z)F
1− (m+ (1−m)z)(1− α + s) − F dz = 0. (A.74)
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(1− α− β + s) L
T − (m+ (1−m)z)F
1− (m+ (1−m)z)(1− α + s) − F dz = 0 (A.75)
⇔1− α− β + s1− α + s
∫ 1
0
(1− α + s)LT − (m+ (1−m)z)(1− α + s)F
1− (m+ (1−m)z)(1− α + s) dz − F = 0 (A.76)
⇔1− α− β + s1− α + s
∫ 1
0
(1− α + s)LT − F
1− (m+ (1−m)z)(1− α + s)dz −
β
1− α + sF = 0 (A.77)
⇔− 1− α− β + s(1−m)(1− α + s)2
[
(1− α + s)LT − F
]
[ln(α− s)− ln(1−m(1− α + s)]
− β1− α + sF = 0 (A.78)
⇔ 1− α− β + s(1−m)(1− α + s)
[




1−m(1− α + s)
α− s
)
− βF = 0 (A.79)
This in turn implies
LT (s,m) = F1− α + s +
β(1−m)F





Note that ∂LT (s,m)
∂m
has the sign of
− ln
[
1−m(1− α + s)
α− s
]




1−m(1− α + s)
]
− α− s1−m(1− α + s) < 0 (A.82)










) = α− s1− α + s, (A.83)
which, plugged into the expression of LT (s,m) yields limm→1 LT (s,m) = (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s .
Finally note that as ε→ 0, the production threshold of them-mass of government-controlled
firms l∗(ε) − ε tends to the (1 −m)-mass of monopolists’ production threshold LT (s,m).
This implies at the limit where ε→ 0, the profits of the m-mass of monopolists are positive
almost certainly when they produce. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
Recall that the production threshold LT (s,m) of the (1−m)-mass of monopolists is derived
in the proof of Proposition 5 from the limit when ε → 0 of the indifference condition in
Eq. (A.73). That indifference condition states that the marginal independent monopolist
should be indifferent between producing and not producing given the strategy of the other
independent monopolists (mass 1 − m) and assuming that all government-controlled mo-
nopolist (mass m) produce. It follows that LT (s,m) is the smallest realization of L above
which the (1−m)-mass of monopolists produce for any strategy followed by the m-mass of
monopolists.
Consider next the condition that implicitly defines LT (s,m) in Eq. (A.79):
∫ 1
0
(1− α− β + s) L
T (s,m)− (m+ (1−m)z)F
1− (m+ (1−m)z)(1− α + s) − F dz = 0 (A.84)
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The function L−xF1−x(1−α+s) is strictly increasing in x for L >
F
1−α+s and L
T (s,m) > F1−α+s .





1−m(1− α + s)−F dz = (1−α−β+s)
LT (s,m)−mF
1−m(1− α + s)−F < 0 (A.85)
That is, at LT (s,m) and a fortiori for L < LT (s,m), the m-mass of monopolists make
strictly negative profits if they produce and the (1 −m)-mass of independent monopolists
do not. Therefore, the optimal government strategy for L < LT (s,m) is for the m-mass
of monopolists not to produce. It follows that all monopolists producing if and only if
L ≥ LT (s,m) is the highest output the government can induce for any production strategy
of the m-mass of monopolists it controls. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of Proposition 6 follows the same line as the proof of Proposition 2 of the baseline
model. We just show here the comparative statics with respect to m. Eq. (A.19) in the
proof of Proposition 2 is equivalent to
αL = 2α + s∗







As in the baseline model, if L > 2, Eq. (A.86)) has a unique solution. Furthermore,
f(s∗,m) > 0, f1(s,m) > 0 and f2(s,m) > 0. Total differentiation of Eq. (A.86) with
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Proof of Proposition 7










LT (s∗(m),m) > (1−β)F (s)1−α−β+s implies that monopolists make positive profits at the threshold
LT (s∗(m),m), which, as in the baseline model (see Proposition 3) implies ∂
∂s
W (s∗,m) < 0.
From Proposition 6, ∂s∗(m)
∂m
< 0 so the first term in Eq. (A.89) is positive. From Proposition 5,
a higher m induces monopolists to coordinate more often on the Pareto-superior production
action (i.e., LT (s,m) is increasing in m ∈ [0, 1) ), which implies that ∂
∂m
W (s∗,m) > 0 (i.e.,
that the second term in Eq. (A.89) is strictly positive) and therefore, that dW (s∗(m),m)
dm
> 0.
From Proposition 5, production is optimal for a given s when m → 1, from Proposition 6
there is a unique symmetric operating leverage equilibrium at t = 0, and from Proposition 4,
if firms coordinate on the Pareto-optimal production plan at t = 1, the symmetric operating
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leverage equilibrium at t = 0 is socially optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8
Define β′ ≡ β1−p . Monopolist q profits are
πq = (1− β′ − α + sq) y − F (sq). (A.90)









From Eq. (A.91), monitoring does not affect aggregate income y for a given set of active
monopolists A: monitoring reduces the profit of each active monopolist by β′y but increases
labor income by the same amount. Hence, the expression for y obtained from Eq. (A.91) is




q∈A F (sq) dq
1−
∫
q∈A 1− α + sq dq
. (A.92)
Consider the case in which all monopolists choose the same operating leverage s at t = 0.
Then combining Eq. (A.90) and Eq. (A.91), a monopolist does not operate if no other
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monopolist operates (if A = {∅}) when
L <
F (s)
1− α− β′ + s . (A.93)
Conversely, a monopolist operates if all other monopolists operate (if A = [0, 1]) when
L >
(1− β′)F (s)





1− α− β′ + s,
F (s)
1− α− β′ + s
)
, (A.95)
Notice that Eq. (3), Eq. (8), Eq. (9), and Eq. (10) are identical to Eq. (A.90), Eq. (A.93),
Eq. (A.94), and Eq. (A.95) except that the first four equations depend on parameter β and
the last four depend on parameter β′. Therefore, an equivalent to Proposition 1 still holds,
that is, if monopolists choose s, they operate at t = 1 if L ≥ LTβ′(s) where
LTβ′(s) ≡
F (s)
1− α + s +
β′F (s)









α−s if L ≥ L
T
β′(s)
L if L < LTβ′(s)
. (A.97)
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Suppose monopolist q chooses operating leverage sq while all other monopolists choose s.
Monopolist q produces when it makes a profit, that is, when
(1− α− β′ + sq) yβ′(s, L)− F (sq) ≥ 0, (A.98)
or equivalently, when




(α− s) F (sq)1− α− β′ + sq
+ F (s), LTβ′(s)
}




1− α− β′ + sq
, LTβ′(s)
}
if sq < s.
(A.99)




min{L̂β′ (sq ,s∗β′ ),L}
(1− α− β + sq) yβ′(s∗β′ , L)− F (sq) dL. (A.100)
Notice that Eq. (17) and Eq. (A.100) identical except that the first equation depends on
parameter β and the second equation depends on parameter β′. Therefore, one can show












The social planer chooses leverage at t = 0 but cannot avoid coordination failures at t = 1.









1− α− β ′ + s
)











Notice that the social planer’s optimization problem in Eq. (A.102) is different from the
problem in Eq. (19). In Eq. (19), the extra labor income βy earned by supervisors in
states in which monopolists are active merely compensates them for their effort cost and
therefore, labor income net of monitoring disutility always sums up to L. Consequently,
in Eq. (19) maximizing consumers’ expected utility amounts to maximizing their expected
income from corporate profits. However, in Eq. (A.102) the extra labor income β′y earned
by supervisors in states in which monopolists are active more than compensates them for
their effort cost βy. Consequently, in Eq. (A.102) maximizing consumers’ expected utility
amounts to maximizing the sum of the expected income from corporate profits plus the
expected supervisors’ rent. Since at the optimum LTβ′(s) < L, the first-order derivative of
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Consider the above three terms in turn:






′(s) is 0 at s∗β′ and strictly negative for s > s∗β′ .
















− F ′(s), (A.105)





> 0 and, at the operating threshold (i.e., at L = LTβ′(s)) firms make a
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strictly positive profit:
(1− α− β + s)
LTβ′(s)− F (s)
α− s
> (1− α− β′ + s)
LTβ′(s)− F (s)
α− s
− F (s) > 0 (A.106)
for any s.
It follows, that first-order derivative in Eq. (A.104) is negative for any s ≥ s∗β′ , that is, in
equilibrium there is excessive risk-taking.
Similarly to Eq. (A.20), which defines s∗, the following equation defines s∗β′ :
αL = 2α + s∗β′
2 + L− 11− α + s∗β′ −
β′











Since, β′1−α−β′+s is increasing in β
′ for 1−α+ s and since β′ is increasing in p, then the RHS
is decreasing in p given s∗β′ . Since f ′(.) > 0 the RHS is increasing in s∗β′ given β′ (i.e., given
p). Therefore, s∗β′ is increasing in p.
Let W (s, p) be the welfare function where




(1− α− β + s) yβ′(s, L)− F (s) dL (A.108)
(See Eq. (A.102).) Since LTβ′(s) depends on β
′for any s (see Eq. (A.96)) and since s∗β′ depends
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on β ′ (see Eq. (A.107)) then:
dW (s∗β′ , p)
dp
=
















1− α− β + s∗β′
)






where we have used the fact that min{LTβ′(s∗β′), L} = LTβ′(s∗β′), that is, monopolists will not
choose an operating leverage that never allows them to produce.





< 0 (i.e., the first-order derivative in
Eq. (A.104) is negative for any s ≥ s∗β) and that s∗β′ is increasing in p, therefore, the
first term in the RHS of Eq. (A.110) is negative; (ii) at the threshold, LTβ′(s∗β′), monopolists
make a profit and since β < β′, this means that
(
1− α− β + s∗β′
)
yβ′(s∗β′ , LTβ′(s∗β′))− F (s∗β′) > 0; (A.111)
and (iii) for 1− α+ s > 0, LTβ′(.) is increasing in p given s (i.e., β
′
1−α−β′+s is increasing in p).
(i), (ii), and (iii) imply that
dW (s∗β′ , p)
dp
< 0, (A.112)
that is, welfare decreases in p. Q.E.D
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Proof of Proposition 9
Assume without loss of generality throughout the proof that in equilibrium LT1 < LT2 , that
is, for L ∈ [LT1 (s∗1), LT2 (s∗1, s∗2)) only type-1 monopolists operate while for L ∈ [LT2 (s∗1, s∗2), L]
both types operate. (See the NOTE at the end of the proof.)
• If both types of monopolists operate, the aggregate income is
y(s1, s2, L) ≡
L− n1F (s1)− n2F (s2)
1− n1(1− α−∆1 + s1)− n2(1− α−∆2 + s2)
, (A.113)
and the profit of a type-i firm is
πi(s1, s2, L) ≡ y(s1, s2, L)(1− α−∆i + si)− F (si). (A.114)
The operating threshold for type-2 monopolists if type-1 monopolists operate,
LT2 (s1, s2), satisfies:
π2(s1, s2, LT2 (s1, s2)) = 0 (A.115)
• If only type-1 monopolists operate, the aggregate income is
y(s1, L) ≡
L− n1F (s1)
1− n1(1− α−∆1 + s1)
, (A.116)
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and the profit of a type-i firm is
πi(s1, L) =
L− n1F (s1)
1− n1(1− α−∆1 + s1)
(1− α−∆i + si)− F (si). (A.117)
The operating threshold for type-1 monopolists if type-2 monopolists do not operate,
LT1 (s1), satisfies:
π1(s1, LT1 (s1)) = 0 (A.118)
Claim 1. Let (s∗1, s∗2) be a symmetric equilibrium in which all type-1 monopolists choose s∗1
and all type-2 monopolists choose s∗2 then
E[y|L > LT1 (s∗1)]− F ′(s∗1) = 0 (A.119)
E[y|L > LT2 (s∗1, s∗2)]− F ′(s∗2) = 0. (A.120)
Proof of Claim 1. Consider the local incentives to deviate of a type-1 monopolist q taking
the operating leverage of all the other monopolists as given.













L (1− α−∆1 + sq)− F (sq)dL.
(A.121)
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The first derivative of Eq. (A.121) w.r.t. sq writes:
∫ L
LT2 (s∗1,s∗2)










For s∗1 to be an equilibrium, it must hold that at sq = s∗1 the f.o.c. in Eq. (A.122) must






y(s∗1, s∗2, L)− F ′(s∗1)dL+
∫ LT2 (s∗1,s∗2)
LT1 (s∗1)
y(s∗1, L)− F ′(s∗1)dL ≥ 0 (A.123)
⇔E[y|L ≥ LT1 (s∗1)]− F ′(s∗1) ≥ 0. (A.124)










y(s∗1, L) (1− α−∆1 + sq)− F (sq)dL
(A.125)
The first derivative of Eq. (A.125) w.r.t. sq writes:
∫ L
LT2 (s∗1,s∗2)





y(s∗1, L)− F ′(sq)dL
(A.126)
For s∗1 to be an equilibrium, it must hold that at sq = s∗1 the f.o.c. in Eq. (A.126) must
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be smaller or equal to zero, that is, since
1− n1(1− α−∆1 + s∗1)
1− α−∆1 + sq
F (sq) + n1F (s∗1)
∣∣∣∣∣
sq=s∗1
= LT1 (s∗1) =
F (s∗1)





y(s∗1, s∗2, L)− F ′(s∗1)dL+
∫ LT2 (s∗1,s∗2)
LT1 (s∗1)
y(s∗1, L)− F ′(s∗1)dL ≤ 0 (A.128)
⇔E[y|L ≥ LT1 (s∗1)]− F ′(s∗1) ≤ 0 (A.129)
Combining the two necessary conditions in Eq. (A.124) and Eq. (A.129):
E[y|L > LT1 (s∗1)]− F ′(s∗1) = 0 (A.130)
A similar argument yields the a necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium for type- 2
monopolists:
E[y|L > LT2 (s∗1, s∗2)]− F ′(s∗2) = 0 (A.131)
This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Assuming that LT1 (s1) < LT2 (s1, s2), the social planner chooses s1 and s2 to maximize ex-
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pected profits plus labor income, that is, to maximize W (s1, s2) where
W (s1, s2) ≡ n1
∫ L
LT2 (s1,s2)



















y(s1, s2)− F ′(s1)dL























y(s1, s2)− F ′(s2)dL











= ni[y(s1, s2)− F
′(si)]
1− n1(1− α−∆1 + s1)− n2(1− α−∆2 + s2)
for i = 1, 2 (A.135)





1− n1(1− α−∆1 + s1)
. (A.136)







y(s1, s2)− F ′(s1)dL















y(s1, s2)− F ′(s2)dL
1− n1(1− α−∆1 + s1)− n2(1− α−∆2 + s2)
(A.138)
From Claim 1, at (s1, s2) = (s∗1, s∗2),
∫ L
LT2 (s∗1,s∗2)
y(s∗1, s∗2)− F ′(s∗1)dL+
∫ LT2 (s∗1,s∗2)
LT1 (s∗1)
y(s∗1)− F ′(s∗1)dL = 0, (A.139)









y(s∗1, s∗2)− F ′(s∗1)dL





y(s∗1, s∗2)− F ′(s∗1)dL




In words, at (s1, s2) = (s∗1, s∗2), increasing s1 increases welfare.
From Claim 1, at (s1, s2) = (s∗1, s∗2),
∫ L
LT2 (s∗1,s∗2)
y(s∗1, s∗2)− F ′(s∗2)dL = 0, (A.141)






In words, at (s1, s2) = (s∗1, s∗2), a marginal change in s2 does not change welfare.
NOTE: Since L > 2/α, s∗i ∈ (0, α), which implies that (s∗1, s∗2) are such that LT1 = LT2
cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, Any equilibrium requires
E[y|L > LT2 ]− F ′(s∗2) = 0 (A.143)
E[y|L > LT1 ]− F ′(s∗1) = 0 (A.144)
and, if LT1 = LT2 , Eq. (A.143) and Eq. (A.144) imply that s∗1 = s∗2(= s∗). However, since
∆1 6= ∆2, LT1 (s∗) 6= LT2 (s∗), that is, one type of monopolists would have incentive to start
producing for a lower threshold than the other type of monopolists. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 10
Part I: Local Necessary Equilibrium Condition.
Note first, that the proof of Proposition 1 does not make use of the specific functional form
for F (sq) and therefore, the operating threshold LT (s) in Proposition 1 holds for a generic
function F (sq).
Suppose monopolist q chooses sq while all other monopolists choose s∗ ∈ (0, α). If sq = s∗
then, at L = LT (s∗) monopolist q makes a strictly positive profit if all other monopolist
operate and makes a strictly negative profit if no other monopolist operates. This implies
that we can define an interval [s∗− τ, s∗+ τ ] for some τ > 0 such that if sq ∈ [s∗− τ, s∗+ τ ]





(1− α− β + sq) y(s∗, L)− F (sq) dL, (A.145)




y|L ≥ LT (s∗)
]
− F ′ (s∗) = 0. (A.146)
Part II: Excessive Operating Leverage.





(1− α− β + s)L− F (s)
α− s
− F (s) dL (A.147)
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(1− α− β + s)L







Consider the three above terms in turn





′(s) is 0 at
any interior symmetric equilibrium s∗.














− F ′(s), (A.149)
which, as above, is 0 at s∗.
- Finally, at the operating threshold (i.e., at L = LT (s)) firms make a strictly positive
profit:
(1− α− β + s)L
T (s)− F (s)
α− s
− F (s) > 0 (A.150)
for any s. Therefore, if ∂LT (s∗)
∂s
> 0 , the first-order derivative in Eq. (A.148) is strictly
negative at s = s∗, that is, a marginal decrease in s around s∗ increases welfare.




The local necessary equilibrium condition in Eq. (A.146) writes,
y(LT (s∗), s∗) + y(L, s∗)
2 = F
′(s∗) (A.151)
Since y(L, s∗) is increasing in L, it follows that
y(LT (s∗), s∗) < F ′(s∗) (A.152)
From Eq. (A.5), LT (s∗) is implicitly given by the indifference condition
∫ 1
0
(1− α− β + s∗)ŷ(LT (s∗), s∗, z)− F (s∗) dz = 0 (A.153)
where
ŷ(L, s, z) ≡ L− zF (s)1− z(1− α + s) . (A.154)
∂ŷ(L,s,z)
∂z
(LT (s∗), s∗, .) has the sign of (1 − α + s∗)LT (s∗) − F (s∗) which, from Eq. (13) is
strictly positive. It follows that for any z ∈ (0, 1),
ŷ(LT (s∗), s∗, z) < ŷ(LT (s∗), s∗, 1) = y(LT (s∗), s∗) < F ′(s∗) (A.155)
where the last inequality just repeats Eq. (A.152).
Next, for any z ∈ (0, 1), ∂ŷ(L,s,z)
∂s
(LT (s∗), s∗, .) has the sign of y(LT (s∗), s∗, z)−F ′(s∗) which,
from Eq. (A.155), is strictly negative.
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(1− α− β + s∗)∂ŷ(L, s, z)
∂s




(1− α− β + s∗)∂ŷ(L, s, z)
∂L





Eq. (A.155) implies that the first line of Eq. (A.156) is strictly negative. We have shown
∂ŷ(L,s,z)
∂s
(LT (s∗), s∗, .) < 0 for any z ∈ (0, 1), which implies that the second line of Eq. (A.156)
is also negative. Finally ∂ŷ(L,s,z)
∂L





Online appendix: Production at t=0 and at t=1
In the main model, monopolists choose their operating leverage at t = 0, before uncertainty
about L is realized at t = 1. This captures the idea that firms’ technological and organi-
zational choices are long lasting and therefore, that firms cannot respond to a productivity
shock by swiftly changing their production technologies. In this section, we extend the model
to show that our results remain unchanged when monopolists also produce at t = 0 and can
condition their choice of operating leverage to the current (t = 0) productivity level, pro-
vided that they cannot rapidly adjust their operating leverage to accommodate realizations
of future (t = 1) productivity shocks. Formally, this requires the following changes to the
main model. We assume that production also takes place t = 0. That is, a productivity
shock L0 is realized at t = 0. Then, knowing L0, each monopolists makes an operating
leverage decision, a production decision and the game moves on to t = 1. At t = 1, a new
shock L1 is realized and monopolists make a second production decision. Importantly, a
monopolist cannot adjust its operating leverage between the two production decisions at
t = 0 and t = 1. The productivity shocks {L0, L1 } are uniformly distributed over [0, L] and












where xt(q) is the consumption at t defined over a unit interval of goods indexed by q and
θ ∈ (0, 1] is a time discount factor. Everything else remains the same as in the main model:
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(i) Each good q is produced by a sector, and each sector consists of two types of firms. A
competitive fringe of firms with a constant returns to scale technology in which one unit of
output requires one unit of labour, and a monopolist with access to an increasing returns
to scale technology; (ii) In each period t, monopolist q incurs a marginal cost of α− sq and
a fixed cost of F (sq) to produce, where F (sq) is increasing, convex, and tends to infinity
as sq → α; and (iii) Production by monopolists requires a monitoring effort β per unit of
output.
This extension poses a minor technical challenge. In the baseline model, the equilibrium of
the production game is pinned down as the limit of a dispersed information game in which
monopolists imperfectly observe L after their choices of operating leverage but before their
production decisions. (See Section 3.2.) However, the point of the current extension is to let
monopolists observe L0 before deciding their operating leverages at t = 0, which precludes
having dispersed information about L0 when monopolists make their production decisions
at t = 0. To circumvent this problem while keeping the global games treatment of the
production game identical to the baseline model, we assume that all monopolists perfectly
observe Lt at the beginning of each period t. However, in each period, the realization of the
shock is altered to be Lt + Lt, where Lt is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
σ2. Furthermore, in each period, monopolist q also observes a private noisy signal of Lt,
lq,t = Lt + ξq,t, where ξq,t is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2ξ . Importantly,
at t = 0, monopolist q observes lq,0 after its operating leverage decision but before its
production decision. This design has the appealing property that we can take the limit to
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0 of both σ2ξ and σ2 in a way that (i) maintains equilibrium uniqueness; (ii) leaves Lt as
the only shock at time t (since σ2 → 0, Lt is 0 almost surely); and (iii) has monopolists
producing at t if and only Lt ≥ LT (s), where LT (s) is the same threshold as in the baseline




















Fig. OA1. Timing of events.
Proposition OA.1 below formally states the result that the global games treatment that
we consider in this section delivers the same prediction for the production game as the
prediction of the baseline model. (For the proofs of Propositions OA.1 and OA.2 below, see
at the end of this appendix.)
Proposition OA.1. Suppose all monopolists choose operating leverage s at t = 0, then if
σ → 0 and σξ
σ2
→ 0, monopolists operate in period t if and only if Lt ≥ LT (s), where LT (s)
is defined as in Eq. (13).
Next, we build on Proposition OA.1 to analyze the equilibrium operating leverage at t = 0.
Suppose monopolist q chooses sq while all other monopolists choose s∗ ∈ (0, α). If sq = s∗
and L = LT (s∗), a monopolist q makes a strictly positive profit at t = 1 if all other monopolist
operate and makes a strictly negative profit if no other monopolist operates. This implies
that we can define an interval [s∗− τ, s∗+ τ ] for some τ > 0 such that if sq ∈ [s∗− τ, s∗+ τ ]






1{L0≥LT (s∗)} [(1− α− β + sq) y(s∗, L0)− F (sq)] +
+θ
∫ L
LT (s∗) (1− α− β + sq) y(s∗, L1)− F (sq) dL1
 , (0A.2)
where 1{L0≥LT (s∗)} is an indicator function that takes a value of one when L0 ≥ LT (s∗).
From Eq. (0A.2), the local necessary first order condition for an interior solution writes
1{L0≥LT (s∗)} [y (s∗, L0)− F ′ (s∗)] + θPr
(




y|L1 ≥ LT (s∗)
]




The next proposition shows that around this local equilibrium condition, there is excessive
operating leverage. The logic is identical to the one previously discussed for Proposition 3
and Proposition 10: at the equilibrium leverage s∗, a marginal decrease in the leverage of
all monopolists lead them to switch from inactivity to production just below LT (s∗) (i.e.,
∂LT (s∗)
∂s
> 0) which improves welfare.
Proposition OA.2. Consider a generic increasing and convex function F (.) any symmet-
ric interior equilibrium s∗ at t = 1 satisfies condition in Eq. (0A.3), and a collective marginal
decrease in operating leverage below s∗ increases welfare.
Proof of Proposition OA.1
Suppose all monopolists choose s at t = 0 and monopolist q with signal lq,t produces if and
only if lq,t > l∗ at time t, for t = 1, 2. Consider a monopolist who observes the signal l∗. Its
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. Finally, for a
given realization of Lt, the mass of monopolists that produce at time t is






where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution with mean 0



















 dLt = 0.
(0A.5)
where ϕ(.) is the probability density function of the normal distribution with mean 0 and










then Eq. (0A.5) becomes







l∗ − Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ
l∗)F
1− Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ








 dxt = F.
(0A.7)










1− Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ






















Let X be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. The RHS of Eq. (0A.9) tends
to 2E(X|X>0)















 dxt = 0 (0A.10)





1− Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ













1− Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ





























1− Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ








 dxt < 0. (0A.14)
Combining Eq. (0A.11) and Eq. (0A.14), there exists σ̂ such that, for any function l∗ and





1− Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ



















l∗ − Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ
l∗)F
1− Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ



























l∗ − F − b (0A.18)







(F + b+ F1−α−β+s)
}
, the LHS of Eq. (0A.7) is
strictly greater than F .
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Conversely, suppose l∗ < σ
2+σ2ξ
σ2







l∗ − Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ
l∗)F
1− Φ(xt − σξσ2+σ2
ξ



























l∗ − F + b (0A.21)







(F − b+ F1−α−β+s)
}
, then the LHS of Eq. (0A.7)
is strictly smaller than F .
Taken together these two inequalities imply that Eq. (0A.7) has at least one solution, and
that there exists an interval [l, l] such that for any σξ small enough, all solutions to Eq. (0A.7)












l∗)(1− α + s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡D
(0A.22)























Note that, for any l∗, D > α−s. Furthermore, ϕ(.) is bounded and so is N for any l∗ ∈ [l, l].
It follows that Eq. (0A.23) is strictly positive if σξ
σ2
is small enough. This together with
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Eq. (0A.16) and Eq. (0A.19) imply that the LHS of Eq. (0A.7) is strictly increasing on
l∗ ∈ [l, l] if σξ
σ2
is small enough. Therefore, since (i) Eq. (0A.7) has at least one solution; (ii)
there are no solutions to Eq. (0A.7) outside [l, l] if σξ small enough; and (iii) the LHS of
Eq. (0A.7) is strictly increasing on l∗ ∈ [l, l] if σξ
σ2
is small, then, there is a unique solution
to Eq. (0A.7) if σξ
σ2
small enough.
Assume from now on that σξ
σ2
is small enough. We show next that limσξ→0 σξl∗ = 0. Suppose
it was not true, then either l∗ → +∞ and from Eq. (0A.16), the LHS of Eq. (0A.7) tends
to +∞, which implies Eq. (0A.7) cannot hold; or l∗ → −∞ and from Eq. (0A.19), the LHS
of Eq. (0A.7) tends to −∞, which implies Eq. (0A.7) cannot hold.
Suppose now that σξ → 0. Then Eq. (0A.7) has a unique solution defined by




1− Φ(xt)(1− α + s)
ϕ (xt) dxt = F. (0A.24)
Finally, consider the change of variable z = Φ(xt), Eq. (0A.24) becomes




1− z(1− α + s)dz = F (0A.25)
From Eq. (0A.25), the proof of Proposition 1 and defining LT (s) as the limit of l∗ when
σξ → 0:
LT (s) = F1− α + s +
βF







Proof of Proposition OA.2
Part I: Local Necessary Equilibrium Condition.
Note first, that the proof of Proposition OA.1 does not make use of the specific functional
form for F (sq) and therefore, the operating threshold LT (s) in Proposition OA.1 holds for a
generic function F (sq). Suppose monopolist q chooses sq while all other monopolists choose
s∗ ∈ (0, α). If sq = s∗ and L = LT (s∗), monopolist q makes a strictly positive profit at t = 1
if all other monopolist operate and makes a strictly negative profit if no other monopolist
operates. This implies that we can define an interval [s∗ − τ, s∗ + τ ] for some τ > 0 such
that if sq ∈ [s∗− τ, s∗+ τ ], monopolist q produces if and only if L ≥ LT (s∗). Then, s∗ being
an equilibrium requires that
s∗ ∈ argmax
sq∈[s∗−τ,s∗+τ ]




(1− α− β + sq) y(s∗, L1)− F (sq) dL1,
(0A.27)
where 1{L0≥LT (s∗)} is an indicator function that takes the value of one when L0 ≥ LT (s∗).
If L0 ≥ LT (s∗), the local necessary condition for an interior solution to the monopolist
optimization problem in Eq. (0A.27) writes:
y (s∗, L0)− F ′ (s∗) + θPr
(




y|L1 ≥ LT (s∗)
]
− F ′ (s∗)
]
= 0. (0A.28)
If L0 < LT (s∗), the local necessary condition for an interior solution to the monopolist
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optimization problem in Eq. (0A.27) writes:
E
[
y|L1 ≥ LT (s∗)
]
− F ′ (s∗) = 0. (0A.29)
Part II: Excessive leverage.
Before analyzing the social planner’s optimization problem, we show that the operating
threshold, LT (s∗), increases with operating leverage (i.e., ∂LT (s∗)
∂s
> 0) a result that we will





Proof of Lemma 0A.1.
Consider first the case in which L0 ≥ LT (s∗). The local necessary equilibrium condition in
Eq. (0A.28) writes









Since y(L, s∗) is increasing in L, and LT (s∗) < L, then it follows that
y(LT (s∗), s∗) < F ′(s∗), (0A.31)
as otherwise, the left-hand-side in Eq. (0A.30) would be greater than zero.
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LT1 (s∗) is implicitly given by the indifference condition
∫ 1
0
(1− α− β + s∗)ŷ(LT (s∗), s∗, z)− F (s∗) dz = 0 (0A.32)
where
ŷ(L, s, z) ≡ L− zF (s)1− z(1− α + s) . (0A.33)
∂ŷ(L,s,z)
∂z
(LT (s∗), s∗, .) has the sign of (1 − α + s∗)LT (s∗) − F (s∗) which, from Eq. (13), is
strictly positive. It follows that for any z ∈ (0, 1),
ŷ(LT (s∗), s∗, z) < ŷ(LT (s∗), s∗, 1) = y(LT (s∗), s∗) < F ′(s∗) (0A.34)
where the last inequality just repeats Eq. (0A.31).
Next, for any z ∈ (0, 1), ∂ŷ(L,s,z)
∂s
(LT (s∗), s∗, .) has the sign of y(LT (s∗), s∗, z)−F ′(s∗) which,
from Eq. (0A.34), is strictly negative.








(1− α− β + s∗)∂ŷ(L, s, z)
∂s




(1− α− β + s∗)∂ŷ(L, s, z)
∂L









(LT (s∗), s∗, .) < 0 for any z ∈ (0, 1) which implies that the second line is also negative.
Finally ∂ŷ(L,s,z)
∂L
(LT (s∗), s∗, .) > 0 for any z ∈ (0, 1). Therefore ∂LT (s∗)
∂s∗
> 0.










Since y(L, s∗) is increasing in L, and LT (s∗) < L, then it follows that
y(LT (s∗), s∗) < F ′(s∗), (0A.37)
LT (s∗) is implicitly given by the indifference condition
∫ 1
0
(1− α− β + s∗)ŷ(LT (s∗), s∗, z)− F (s∗) dz = 0 (0A.38)
and identical derivations to the ones in the first case, shows that ∂LT (s∗)
∂s∗
> 0. This completes
the proof of Lemma 0A.1. Q.E.D.
The social planner’s objective function for a given L0 writes
W (s, L0) =1{L0≥LT (s)}
(








(1− α− β + s)L1 − F (s)
α− s
− F (s) dL1,
(0A.39)
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and hence, the optimization problem writes
sOpt ∈ arg max
S
W (s, L0). (0A.40)
Since at the optimum LT (s) < L, the first derivative writes:
- For L0 > LT (s) and for L0 = LT (s) when LT (s)→ L+0 :
L0 − F (s)
α− s
− F ′(s) + (1− α− β + s) ∂
∂s
(






L1 − F (s)
α− s












(1− α− β + s)L












L1 − F (s)
α− s












(1− α− β + s)L













L0 − F (s)
α− s
− F ′(s) + θ
∫ L
LT (s)
L1 − F (s)
α− s




(1− α− β + s)L








Using Eq. (0A.28), Eq. (0A.43) evaluated at s∗ writes:
− θ
[
(1− α− β + s∗)L







Since at the operating threshold (i.e., at L = LT (s)) firms make a strictly positive profit,
(1− α− β + s)L
T (s)− F (s)
α− s
− F (s) > 0 (0A.45)
for any s, and using Lemma 0A.1 (i.e., ∂LT (s∗)
∂s
> 0 ), it follows that the first derivative
in Eq. (0A.41) is strictly negative at s = s∗, that is, a marginal decrease in s around s∗
increases welfare.






L1 − F (s)
α− s
− F ′(s) dL1
− θ
[
(1− α− β + s)L









Using Eq. (0A.29), Eq. (0A.46) evaluated at s∗ writes,
− θ
[
(1− α− β + s∗)L







for any s, and using Lemma 0A.1 (i.e., ∂LT (s∗)
∂s
> 0), it follows that the first derivative in
Eq. (0A.42) is strictly negative at s = s∗, that is, a marginal decrease in s around s∗ increases
welfare.
Case 3 : L0 = LT (s∗). The social welfare function is not continuos at L0 = LT (s∗) as
an increase in s beyond s∗ leads monopolists not to produce at t = 0. Consider first the




(1− α− β + s∗)L







Since at the operating threshold (i.e., at L = LT (s)) firms make a strictly positive profit,
(1− α− β + s)L
T (s)− F (s)
α− s
− F (s) > 0 (0A.49)
for any s, and using Lemma 0A.1 (i.e., ∂LT (s∗)
∂s
> 0), it follows the first derivative for
L0 = LT (s∗) when LT (s) → LT (s∗)+ (that is, when s → s∗− since ∂L
T (s∗)
∂s
> 0) is negative,
that is, a marginal decrease in s around s∗ from below increases welfare.
Consider now the case in which L0 → LT (s)− (that is, in which s → s∗+). Since LT (s∗) is
increasing in s∗ (Lemma 0A.1) and since monopolists make strictly positive profits at the
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threshold, L = LT (s∗), it follows there is a discrete increase in the welfare function at s∗
when s approaches s∗ from above and monopolists start producing at t = 0, that is,
lim
s→s∗+
W (s, LT (s)) < W (s∗, LT (s∗)). (0A.50)
Therefore, an increase in operating leverage beyond s∗ decreases welfare in an interval
(s∗, s∗ + δ) for some δ > 0. In summary, at L0 = LT (s∗), a decrease in s∗ increases welfare
and an increase in s∗ decreases welfare. Q.E.D.
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